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LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND KOREA’S FINANCIAL
SERVICES MARKET: A STRATEGIC APPROACH
Young-Cheol Jeong†
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to improve the compliance level in the
Korean financial services market by proposing a more systematic approach to economic
crimes. As one of the most important capital markets in Asia, the Korean financial
services market has weathered well both the hardship of the Asian financial crisis and the
challenges of the Great Recession. Thus, its policy directions and experience are
valuable to other burgeoning capital markets around the world. This paper contributes to
a better understanding of the compliance system in the Korean financial services market.
Based on a literature review, this paper analyzes the three groups of counter-measures—
criminal sanctions, administrative sanctions, and civil remedies. Currently, criminal
sanctions on individuals are overly relied upon; administrative sanctions on corporate
entities have become increasingly important; civil remedies by the damaged are not
effective; and preventive efforts have been disregarded. The ultimate goal of regulations
is to let regulated entities comply with legal requirements. With respect to crimes in the
financial services market, educational and compliance programs should be implemented
as important built-in enforcement tools. Enforcement mechanisms should encompass
preventive and educational efforts. Further, redesigning new compliance structures based
on education will free market players from fastidious regulatory policies and
discretionary criminal indictment, and improve the trust in the financial system with
minimal social costs.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 1, 2010, the International Monetary Fund Executive
Board, in its Article IV Consultation-Staff Report, observed that the South
Korean (“Korean”) economy has had impressive success over the past year.1
The real GDP for 2009 was KRW 1,063 trillion, equalling about U.S. $1
trillion.2 The Board also projected 6.1% growth in 2010.3 Korea’s trade
volume is expected to reach $1 trillion in 2011,4 after reaching an expected

†
Professor of Law, Yonsei Law School. Member of Korea, Illinois, and District of Columbia Bars.
Seoul National University College of Law, LL.B. 1978, LL.M. 1982. Columbia Law School, LL.M. 1984,
J.D. 1986. I truly appreciate the insightful comments and legitimate questions regarding this articles’s draft
that were raised by an anonymous reviewer.
1
See generally INT’L MONETARY FUND (“IMF”), COUNTRY REPORT NO. 10/270 (Sept. 2010),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10270.pdf.
2
Id. at 24.
3
Id. at 7.
4
Korea’s exports are expected to increase by an estimated 10.3% in 2011, reaching $513 billion,
while imports are expected to surge by 15.1% to $488 billion. KOREAN MINISTRY OF KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY,
2011
BUSINESS
PLAN,
available
at
http://www.mke.go.kr/news/bodo/bodoView.jsp?seq=65436&pageNo=3&srchType=1&srchWord=&pCtx
=1.
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$891.59 billion in 2010.5 Within the financial services market,6 the market
capitalization at Korea Exchange (“KRX”) in 2009 was $834.5 billion.7 The
amount of listed bonds as of 2009 was KRW 1,013 trillion.8 The total of
bank loans to corporate customers and individuals was KRW 719 trillion and
KRW 595 trillion, respectively, as of the end of 2010. 9 Considering the
global recession that started in 2007 is still lingering in Europe and the
United States, the Korean economy’s recovery is “impressive.”10 Table 1
shows the market capitalization of major exchanges in the world.
[TABLE 1] MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF MAJOR EXCHANGES (2009)
Exchanges

Unit: U.S. $1,000

NYSE Euronext
NASDAQ OMX
Shanghai SE + Shenzhen SE
Tokyo SE Group + Osaka SE + Jasdaq
Singapore
KRX
HK
Bombay SE

11,837,793
3,239,492
2,704,778 + 868,374 = 3,573,152
3,306,082 + 138,329 + 89,567 = 3,533,978
481,267
834,596a
2,305,142
1,306,520

a) KRX had exceeded $1 trillion by the end of 2010, due to the sound
economy, qualitative easing, and KRW appreciation. 11
Source: World Federation of Exchanges

In contrast to the successful economic performance, the Korean
business community has been in a vicious cycle of ad hoc criminal and
administrative investigations, sanctions, and pardons. 12 In 2010, several
5
Korea Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 33:2 Monthly Economic Bulletin 16 (Feb. 2011),
available at http://english.mosf.go.kr/.
6
The term “financial services market” includes the insurance industry in most cases. However, it
sometimes refers to only banking and capital market industries, depending on the context.
7
Market Statistics—2008-2009 Domestic Market Capitalization, WORLD FEDERATION OF
EXCHANGES,
http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2009/equity-markets/domestic-marketcapitalization (download “EQUITY109.xls”) (last visited May 13, 2011).
8
Id. Public and private bonds were KRW 759 trillion and KRW 254 trillion, respectively. Id.
9
Economic Statistics System, BANK OF KOREA, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).
10
IMF, supra note 1, at 3; see also Jong-Goo Yi, Commissioner, Fin. Service Comm’n (“FSC”),
Presentation at Korea-FSB Reform Conference: Korea’s Experience and Policy Responses to Global
Financial Crisis, (Sept. 3, 2010).
11
The amount of market capitalization was KRW 1.239 trillion. Review of 2010 Statistics, KOREA
EXCHANGE (“KRX”), http://eng.krx.co.kr/m8/m8_5/m8_5_1/BHPENG08005_01_01.jsp (last visited Apr.
27, 2011).
12
This vicious cycle, however, is not limited to Korea. Raaj K. Sah, Social Osmosis and Patterns of
Crime, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1272, 1280 (1991) (“An individual has a higher current propensity for crime if
fewer resources were spent on the criminal apprehension system during a past period of his active life.
Fewer resources dilute the resources spent on apprehending each criminal.”). See generally MARTIN T.
BIEGELMAN & JOEL T. BARTOW, PREVENTION AND INTERNAL CONTROL (2006).
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conglomerates came under investigation for the crimes of embezzlement or
breach of fiduciary duty, leading to the prosecution of several executives
from major Korean corporations.13 On August 13, 2010, a group of business
leaders were pardoned, including those whose sentences were finalized less
than a year before. 14 These cases demonstrate prevalent financial
misconduct in Korea, as well as a disregard for legal compliance by top
management. The rule of law in Korea, as far as the business world is
concerned, has a long way to catch up to be on par with the economic
performance. The gap between the economic performance and the legal
quagmire demonstrates the urgent need to develop a more effective
enforcement mechanism. It is indeed one of many challenges that Korean
lawyers, along with other parts of Korean society, should seek to overcome.
Korea relies heavily on criminal sanctions in regulating financial
markets.15 The Public Prosecutor’s Office has long been one of the business
13
See, e.g., Criminal Probe into ex-Shinhan Bank Pres. Begins, DONGA ILBO, Sept. 4, 2010,
http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=020000&biid=2010090451578 (“Seoul prosecutors
began an investigation Friday into allegations of embezzlement and breach of duty against Shinhan
Financial Group President Shin Sang-hoon. Shinhan Bank filed a criminal complaint against Shin, saying
he illegally provided huge loans to companies in poor financial health while serving as the bank’s
president.”); Local Firms on U.S. Fine List, JOONGANG DAILY, Jun. 11, 2010 (listing the ten multinational
corporations that paid the largest antitrust fines to the United States between 1999 and 2010; the four
Korean companies included—LG Display Co., Korean Air, Samsung Electronics Co. and Hynix
Semiconductor, Inc.—paid a combined KRW 1.6 trillion [$1.28 billion]); see also Yoon Bae Park, The
Corporate Governance Fix for Korea, WALL STREET J., Feb. 22, 2011, at 11.
14
See, e.g., Policy News, KOREAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Aug. 13, 2010. Five Samsung executives
were sentenced in 2009 for managing slush funds and avoiding tax. Id. The chairman was pardoned at the
2009 year-end pardon exercise. Id. Operators of more than KRW 4.5 trillion slush funds were cleared
within three years from the date of investigation by special prosecutors. Id. Samsung Securities, which
was a conduit of operating the funds, was just warned. Id. Samsung Life Ins. executives who destroyed
evidence were released. Id. This might be a necessity to balance the need to maintain the rule of law
against the wider public interest, such as that of the national economy.
15
See infra Table 4. Over-criminalization in the United States has also been the subject of criticism.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U.L. REV. 193 (1991) (“[B]lurring of the border between
tort and crime predictably will result in injustice.”); Steven Williams, The More Law, the Less Rule of Law,
2 GREEN BAG 2D 403, 405 (1999) (“As the commands of the state multiply, there is a corresponding
decline in the fraction of those commands that people can be expected to comply with.”); William J. Stuntz,
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, (2001) (“[C]riminal law does not drive
criminal punishment . . . . [T]he role [the definition of crimes and defenses] plays is to empower
prosecutors, who are the criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,
Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 175-917
(2004) (arguing deterrence does not work because of the legal knowledge hurdle, the rational choice hurdle,
and the perceived net cost hurdle). Sentence severity may have a limited effect on compliance. See
generally Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Maire Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null
Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 145 (2003) (“[T]he deterrent impact of penalty size has been seriously
challenged by modern criminology.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cass R. Sunstein, Book Review:
The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2002) (“[P]eople often neglect probabilities [and] focus
on worst case outcomes.”).
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sector’s most feared agencies (along with the National Tax Administration
and the Board of Audit and Inspection), although now to a lesser degree than
in the past. Almost every instance of misconduct in the financial market
automatically leads to criminal sanctions, at least according to statute.16 The
basic regulatory theory and principle in Korea appears to be that more severe
penalties will naturally reduce crimes. 17 Criminal sanctions, traditionally
regarded as the most forceful sanctions an individual can face, are an attempt
to ensure compliance founded on fear; 18 individuals fear going to prison
when they violate the law. Administrative sanctions, especially civil fines,
are another method grounded on fear. Corporate entities are loath to part
with their hard-earned economic gains when they breach legal
requirements.19 Sanctions, however, are more effective for retributive justice
rather than for preventive justice.20 Additionally, sanctions are not effective
in handling all crimes, and their use likely leads to under-enforcement.21 As
the Korean financial services sector expands in size and geography and
becomes more complicated and specialized, criminal and administrative
sanctions tend to be less effective at curbing misconduct in the market. As
the number of cases and complaints increases, 22 the current Korean
regulation system is at risk of severe under-enforcement. In turn, this could
erode civic norms of obedience.23
This article argues that in order to avoid such an undesirable situation,
Korea should strengthen its preventive regulatory system. To combat
16
See Jabonshijanggwa gwemyungtoojae gwanhan bup [Capital Markets and Financial Investment
Business Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007 amended by Act No. 10366, Jun. 11, 2012, arts. 443-46
[hereinafter Capital Markets Act]; Eunhangbup [Banking Act], Act No. 5499, Jan. 31, 1998, amended by
Act No. 10303, Nov. 18. 2010, arts. 66-68 [hereinafter Banking Act]; see also infra Table 2.
17
Responses to the recent savings bank crisis exhibit the same severe penalties. See Press Release,
Financial Services Board, Stricter Supervision of Savings Bank (Mar. 17, 2011); Se Young Lee, South
Korea fights fire among its savings bank, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18-20, 2011, at 20; Se Young Lee, South Korea
suspends 4 more savings banks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2011, at 20; Se Young Lee, Korea will stiffen bank
supervision, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2011, at 21.
18
JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, Ch. I (1789).
19
Some attorneys criticize the utilitarian view. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 350 (1997) (“The phenomena of social influence and social
meaning matter for deterrence.”); Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL EDU. 661, 66263 (1998) (positing law, social norms, market, and architecture are four types of constraints on behaviors).
20
See supra note 15 (discussing the inefficacy of criminal punishment as a deterrent).
21
See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Law and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 N.W. U. L.
REV. 655, 658, 667-70 (2006).
22
See Chun-Hyun Lee, Phenomena of Economic Crimes: Changes, Reality and Characteristics, 19
CRIM. POL’Y 173 (2007). Monthly and yearly crime statistics are available at the Supreme Prosecutor’s
Office website at www.spo.go.kr.
23
See Cheng, supra note 21, at 659-61. Additional problems associated with retributive sanctions
include a substantial risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, harm to the authority of the law, and
degradation of law enforcement into a sporting chance. Id.
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economic crimes,24 future enforcement efforts should focus on a forwardlooking perspective—systematic and strategic preventive mechanisms and
incentivized rewards, accompanied by reasonably certain and severe
penalties. Sanctions and preventive measures are not sequential, however.
Instead, they should co-exist. They are not a matter of choice or
replacement, but a matter of focus and perspective.
This article is an attempt to improve compliance by introducing
preventive mechanisms to the enforcement structure of financial services
market crimes in Korea, thereby re-establishing the authority of the law.
This is an essential and necessary step before Korea is truly ruled by law and
thus establishes itself as a financially advanced country. Part II reviews the
regulatory structure of the financial services market in Korea. Part III
explores the status of ex post facto counter-measures for economic crimes.
It will show that criminal sanctions are the traditional answer to crimes in
Korea. Administrative sanctions, including civil fines, are the second most
popular response, and civil actions for compensation of damages are just
emerging. Part IV provides an overview of ex ante mechanisms under
current Korean laws.
Although they appear ineffective and even
perfunctory, some preventive control mechanisms are in place in several
statutes. Finally, Part V presents proposals to make these existing
mechanisms more effective. First, preventive measures should become the
favored means of improving these mechanisms. Courts should consider a
company’s preventive efforts as mitigating factors when a breach occurs.
Education, which has driven economic development in Korea for the past
several decades, should also be a major part of prevention-based
enforcement. Second, the rules themselves must be clear and limit
discretionary enforcement.25 Various sanctions should be coordinated to the
effect that law enforcement is not left to chance. Finally, in striking a

24
The term “economic crime” in Korea is broader than white-collar crime or corporate crime in
other jurisdictions. See JUDICIAL RESEARCH TRAINING AND INSTITUTE, DISCUSSION ON ECONOMIC CRIMES
3-10 (2009). According to most public prosecutors, “economic crime” also covers customs duty violations
and intellectual property rights infringement crimes. Id. It is characterized as profit-motivated, imitative,
and corrupt. Id. Some use the term “financial crimes” and they are classified into four groups: corruption,
fraud, theft, and manipulation. See Petter Gottschalk, Categories of Financial Crime, 17 J. FIN. CRIME 441,
443 (2010). Each category has subsets of crimes. Id. Corruption, for example, includes kickbacks,
bribery, extortion, and embezzlement. Id. This article uses the terms “financial crime,” “economic crime,”
and “crime in the financial market” interchangeably.
25
See Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two
Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 865, 865 (2008)
(“In addition to sanctions and legitimacy, law can also influence compliance simply by making one
outcome salient.”).
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balance between public and private and between criminal and administrative,
enforcement mechanisms should move towards the latter in both cases.
II.

REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SERVICES MARKETS

Part II provides an overview of the Korean laws applicable to
financial sectors. While financial services are in the process of convergence,
the regulatory legal scheme is still compartmentalized because three
different statutes regulate banking, capital markets, and insurance. On the
regulatory agency level, the Financial Services Commission covers financial
services in general and establishes regulatory policies. The Financial
Supervisory Services then implements the policies across the board.
A.

Applicable Laws

The Banking Act, 26 the Financial Investment Services and Capital
Markets Act (“Capital Markets Act”), 27 and the Insurance Business Act28
(collectively, “the tripartite statutes”) are three pillars that support the
financial services market. Aside from the tripartite statutes, separate statutes
govern special banks, such as the Korea Development Bank, Industrial Bank
of Korea, and Korea EXIM Bank. 29 Mutual savings banks and capital
companies for both consumers and small-to-medium enterprises are
governed by the Mutual Savings Banks Act and the Special Credit Financial
Business Act.30
For the past decade, the Banking Act and the Insurance Business Act
have undergone frequent amendments—five times for the Banking Act31 and
26

Banking Act, supra note 16.
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16. The Capital Markets Act entered into effect on Feb. 4, 2009,
one year and six months after its adoption into law on Aug. 3, 2007.
28
Bohumupbup [Insurance Business Act], Act No. 6891, May 29 2003, amended by Act No. 10394,
Jan. 14, 2011 [hereinafter Insurance Business Act]. Insurance contracts are regulated by Book 5 of the
Korean Commercial Code. Welfare insurance, such as employment, health care, or occupational injury
compensation, is covered by independent statutes.
29
Hangugsan eob eunhaeng [Korea Development Bank Act], Act No. 302, Dec. 30, 1953, amended
by Act No. 10303, Nov. 18, 2010; Jungsokieeop eunhaeng [Industrial Bank of Korea Act], Act No. 641, Jul.
1, 1961 amended by Act No. 10303, Nov. 18, 2010; Hangug soochulip eunhaeng [Korea EXIM Bank Act],
Act No. 2122, Jul. 1, 1961, amended by Act No. 10303, Nov. 18, 2010. While the Industrial Bank of Korea
(“IBK”) is listed on KRX, an IPO of the Korea Development Bank (“KDB”) is under consideration. KDB,
as a holding company, owns Korea Finance Corporation, Daewoo Securities, KDB Capital, and KDB Asset
Management.
30
Sanghojuchuoeunhanbup [Mutual Savings Banks Act], Act No. 2333, amended by Act No. 10303,
No. 18, 2010; YeoshinjunmoonKeumyungupbup [Special Credit Financial Business Act], Act No. 5374,
amended by Act No. 10062, Jun. 13, 2010.
31
Banking Act, supra note 16. See Act No. 10303, amended May 17, 2010, effective Nov. 18, 2010;
Act No. 9784, amended Jun. 9, 2009, effective Oct. 10, 2009; Act No. 8906, amended and effective Mar.
27
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six times for the Insurance Business Act. 32 Most changes were not
motivated by a concern for specific financial crimes or misconduct. Instead,
two other factors drove the amendments. First, they were the result of a
general industry trend from government-dominated, implicit, bureaucratic
regulations toward privatized, lucid regulations for investors. Second, they
were driven by an aim to protect the interest of investors and creditors by
reducing the possibility of major shareholders privatizing controlling
interests. For example, the most recent amendment to the Banking Act
liberalized the scope of the banking business sector and improved the
corporate governance structure.33 The most recent change to the Insurance
Business Act increased protection of insurance consumers by imposing a
duty to explain and by making corporate governance more transparent.34
The enforcement of the Capital Markets Act in 2009 resulted in
sweeping changes because it consolidated six investment banking businessrelated laws: the Securities and Exchanges Act, Futures Trading Act, Asset
Management Business Act, Trust Business Act, Merchant Banking Business
Law, and Korea Securities and Futures Exchange Act. Before the Capital
Markets Act, the six laws regulated different segments of the financial
industry with the same function—overseeing business licenses.35 Thus, the
Capital Markets Act was a game changer, moving Korea’s institutional
regulatory framework to a functional regulatory framework.36
The Capital Markets Act also delegated much of its rule-making and
enforcement functions to self-regulating organizations such as the Korean
Exchange (“KRX”) and the Korean Financial Investment Association
(“KOFIA”).
For example, KRX has the authority to establish
listing/disclosure standards and trading/settlement rules at the KRX
exchange,37 while KOFIA approves over-the-counter derivative products.38
Accordingly, KRX and KOFIA have established many regulations on capital
markets.
14, 2008; Act No. 6691 amended Apr. 27, 2002, effective Jul. 28, 2002; and Act No. 6177 amended on Jan.
21, 2000, effective Apr. 22, 2000.
32
Insurance Business Act, supra note 28. See Act No. 10394, amended Jul. 23, 2010, effective Jan.
24, 2011; Act No. 8902, amended Mar. 14, 2008, effective Jun. 15, 2008; Act No. 8520, amended Jul. 19,
2007, effective Jan. 20, 2008; Act No. 8386 amended and effective Apr. 27, 2007; Act No. 7971 amended
and effective Aug. 29, 2006; Act No. 6891 amended on May 29, 2003, effective Aug. 20, 2003.
33
Banking Act, supra note 16.
34
Insurance Business Act, supra note 28.
35
Consolidation is still on its way in the sense that banking and insurance are still separately
regulated by different statutes.
36
See KOREA MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION, REASON FOR NEW ENACTMENT, available
at http://www.law.go.kr.
37
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 373-414.
38
Id. arts. 283-93.
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Regulatory Agencies

The legal structure employs three different statutes to govern financial
intermediaries such as the merchant banking, investment banking, and
insurance industries. In contrast, all financial services are regulated by one
centralized agency. 39 In other words, although institutional fragmentation
still exists among these financial intermediaries, the regulatory organizations
governing them were completely unified immediately after the 1997
financial crisis into one agency—the Financial Services Commission.
The Financial Services Commission was launched as the policy
development agency, taking over the role of the Ministry of Finance. 40
Based on authorization from the Banking Act, the Capital Markets Act, and
the Insurance Business Act, the Financial Services Commission establishes
policies regarding financial markets in general. 41 Meanwhile, Financial
Supervisory Services, a private entity, became the implementation arm under
the Financial Services Commission. 42 It primarily handles enforcement
functions, although not exclusively. 43 The Securities and Futures
Commission, under the Financial Services Commission, maintains the
primary authority to make decisions on administrative sanctions for certain
breaches under the Capital Markets Act. 44 KRX and KOFIA, as selfregulating organizations, have the authority to monitor and sanction their
members.45
C.

Investigation

When violations of the tripartite statutes occur, a prosecutor may
initiate an investigation if he or she reasonably believes that such
investigation would lead to successful criminal prosecution under the

39

Keumyungweewonhoeei sulchi deunge gwanhan beopyul [Act on the Establishment, Etc., of
Financial Services Commission], Act No. 5490, Dec. 31, 1997, amended by Act No. 10303, May 17, 2010,
art. 17 [hereinafter Financial Services Commission Act].
40
KOREA MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 36.
41
The rules and procedures of the Financial Services Commission are available at
http://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/.
42
Financial Services Commission Act, supra note 39, arts. 24-50.
43
Id.
44
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 439. The Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”)
regulates unfair trading activities, which include insider trading, the 5% rule, major shareholder reporting,
short-term windfall profits, failure to file periodic disclosure documents, the filing of false registration
statements, and price manipulation. Id. arts. 172-74, 176, 178, 180, 427.
45
KOREA SECURITIES LAWYERS ASSOCIATION (“KSLA”), A STUDY ON REGULATORY SYSTEM
UNDER THE CAPITAL MARKETS ACT 172-78 (2006).
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Korean Criminal Procedural Act. 46 In practice, however, market regulators
have the responsibility and power to monitor the market. 47 Thus, in
instances of abnormalities in trading,48 the KRX has the primary authority to
request that the financial investment licensee produce relevant materials, or
to audit the status of the assets, books, and other materials of its members.49
The Financial Services Commission may also request that KRX or the
Financial Supervisory Services use the audit process and file a report.50 For
banks and insurance companies, the Financial Services Commission can ask
the Financial Supervisory Services to audit the questionable practices.51
An agency may only initiate an investigation after establishing that it
possesses the proper authority to do so. The Financial Services Commission
may launch its own investigation procedure by requesting that a relevant
party submit an affidavit, take the witness stand, or produce documents.52 If
the Securities and Futures Commission wishes to investigate unfair trade
practices,53 it may secure a search warrant from the court for such exercise.54
In the case of the most serious violations, 55 the Financial Services
Commission files a criminal complaint with the Public Prosecutor’s Office
for indictment. 56 The Public Prosecutor’s Office can also investigate the
KRX, the Financial Supervisory Services, and other self-regulating
organizations with the assistance of experts from these organizations.57

46
Hyongsa sosong beob [Criminal Procedure Act], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, amended by Act
No. 8730, Dec. 21, 2007, art. 195.
47
See Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 426-27.
48
See id. art. 355; Enforcement Decree of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets
Act, Presidential Decree No. 20947, Jul. 29, 2008, amended by Presidential Decree No. 21291, Feb. 3,
2009, art. 355 (Korean Financial Investment Association trans. 2009) [hereinafter Capital Markets Act
E.D.] (defining abnormal trading).
49
Id. art. 404. KRX is required to institute Market Monitoring Comm. pursuant to Art. 403 of the
Capital Markets Act. For discussion on the actual practice of investigation, see In-Bong Jang, Practical
Matters and Issues Relating to Finding Illegality in Unfair Transactions of Securities, 8 K. J. SEC. L. 213,
218-20 (2007).
50
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 410.
51
See id. art. 426(1).
52
See id. art. 426(2).
53
See id. arts. 172-74, 176, 178, 180.
54
See id. art. 427.
55
See, e.g. Se Young Lee & Alison Tudor, South Korea Sanctions Deutsche Unit for Market
Manipulation, WALL ST. J.; see also Press Release, Financial Services Commission, Price Drop on Option
Expiration Date (Feb. 23, 2011).
56
According to the Financial Supervisory Service (“FSS”), predominant cases were transferred to
the public prosecutor’s office. See FSS, 2009 YEARBOOK, Table 2-18 (2010). In the case of unfair trading,
more than 80% of cases ended up with a criminal indictment. Id. at 69.
57
Judicial Research and Training Institute, supra note 24, at 216-17.
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EX POST FACTO MEASURES

Part III explores the types and scopes of legal sanctions imposed when
violations occur. Depending on the legal nature of the initiating entity, legal
sanctions may be public or private. Public sanctions comprise two types of
sanctions: criminal and administrative. Criminal sanctions commence when
the prosecutory organization issues a criminal indictment and end when the
court imposes a sentence. By contrast, administrative sanctions commence
and end at the initiative of administrative agencies, such as the Financial
Services Commission. If the violator wants to challenge the administrative
sanctions, he or she can file a complaint with the court and seek revocation
of such administrative measures. Alternatively, private individuals may sue
in court for damages in accordance with the court’s procedural rules.
A.

Criminal Sanctions

Criminal sanctions are the most severe form of legal sanctions. What
conduct constitutes a crime and who is punishable are important policy
issues. The process of criminalization is particularly significant.
1.

Strata of Criminal Conduct

The tripartite statutes—the Banking Act, the Capital Markets Act, and
the Insurance Business Act—take the typical structure of a statute in Korea;
the last chapter of each statute is about penalties. In the case of the Banking
Act, criminal conduct is subject to four tiers of sanctions: group one for up
to ten years imprisonment or a fine of KRW 500 million;58 group two for up
to five years of imprisonment or a fine of KRW 200 million;59 group three
for up to three years of imprisonment or a fine of KRW 100 million;60 and
group four for up to one year of imprisonment or a fine of KRW 30
million. 61 The Capital Markets Act adopts the same four-tiered system:
imprisonment of ten, five, three and one year(s); and a fine of KRW 500,
200, 100, and 30 million, respectively (see Table 2). 62 The Insurance
Business Act mandates a five-tier system: imprisonment of ten, seven, five,
three and one years. 63 The corresponding fines are lower than under the
Banking Act and the Capital Markets Act: KRW 50, 40, 30, 20, and 10
58
59
60
61
62
63

Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 66(1).
Id. art. 66(2).
Id. art. 67.
Id. art. 68(1).
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 443-46.
Insurance Business Act, supra note 28, arts. 197-204.
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million, respectively (see Table 3). It is not clear why the fines under the
Insurance Business Act are lower than those under the Banking Act or the
Capital Markets Act. It may be because the Banking Act and Capital
Markets Act were revised recently, increasing the amount of fines, while the
Insurance Business Act’s fines simply have not been correspondingly
revised.64 The Banking Act and the Capital Markets Act are often subject to
discussions for revisions, while the Insurance Business Act has received less
criticism.
[TABLE 2] CRIMINAL CONDUCT AND SANCTIONS UNDER
BANKING ACT & CAPITAL MARKETS ACT
Tier

Sanctions (in
years/KRW million)

Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
Tier 4

10 years/KRW 500
5 years/ KRW 200
3 years/KRW 100
1 year/KRW 30

THE

Statutory Provisions (Number of categories of criminal
conduct)
Banking Act
Capital Markets Act
Art. 66(1) (four)
Art. 443a (nine)
Art. 66(2) (one)
Art. 444 (twenty-nine)
Art. 67 (two)
Art. 445 (forty-eight)
Art. 68(1) (eight)
Art. 446 (sixty-three)

a) If the amount of damages arising out of criminal conduct exceeds KRW 500
million, the maximum sentence ranges from 3 years to life. Capital Markets Act,
Art. 443(2).
Source: Banking Act & Capital Markets Act

[TABLE 3] CRIMINAL CONDUCT
INSURANCE BUSINESS ACT
Tier
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
Tier 4
Tier 5

Sanctions (in years/KRW
million)
10 years/KRW 50
7 years/KRW 40
5 years/KRW 30
3 years/KRW 20
1year/KRW 10

AND

Statutory Provisions
Art. 197
Arts. 198 & 199
Arts 200 & 201
Art. 202
Art.203

SANCTIONS UNDER

THE

Number of Categories of
Criminal Conduct
One
Five
Six
Six
Thirteen

Source: Insurance Business Act

The current criminal sanctions are quite mechanical, at least in terms
of statutory provisions. Minor failures to report a quarterly report, for
example, go to the catch-all administrative fine section.65 Except for those
minor infractions, almost every violation of statutory prohibitions or other

64

See supra notes 31-32 (citing revisions of the Banking Act and Insurance Business Act).
Insurance Business Act, supra note 28, art. 449(1)-(13). Violations that are subject to
administrative fines are perceived to be less egregious than those subject to criminal sanctions. However,
such a distinction does not always make sense. For example, a failure to institute internal control systems
is a serious violation, yet it is only subject to administrative fines. See id. art. 449(1)-(9).
65
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requirement falls within one of four or five categories and each category
corresponds with a certain combination of imprisonment and fines.66
There is much room for improvement. First, it is undesirable to
criminalize every violation of almost every section in the tripartite statutes.67
This is the archetypal over-criminalization of government policies. 68
Criminal conduct should be limited to critical violations that would damage
the system itself. Only price manipulation, insider trading, and false
accounting should be conceptualized as securities crimes.
Second,
imprisonment for up to ten years should not merely be an alternative to a
KRW 500 million fine. 69 Imprisonment, along with the confiscation of
economic gains, would be a better option because violations could be more
effectively deterred by making them costly.70 Third, it should be considered
whether ten years is an appropriate maximum term of imprisonment. For
example, in the case of capital market fraud, the current maximum term of
five years is disproportionate to the violations; a longer term would be more
appropriate. 71 Finally, the scope of discretion permitted by the Capital
Markets Act is too broad. The same violation could be subject to ten years
imprisonment and/or a fine of KRW 500 million.72 This wide discretion
within the hands of the prosecutor’s office and the judicial branch should be
controlled, or at least checked, to prevent any abuse of discretion.
2.

Liability

The prohibitions and requirements under the tripartite statutes are
addressed to individuals, corporate entities, or both. For example, individual
CEOs not only must certify the accuracy of periodic filing statements of
their investment banking houses, but must also file their own personal
periodic reports with the Financial Services Commission. Regarding
criminal sanctions, the complex relationship between an individual and the

66

See id. arts. 197-204.
In-Bong Jang, supra note 49, at 257-58.
68
See, e.g, John Hasnas, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime: Ethics and the Problem of
White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579 (2005).
69
See Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 66(1).
70
The Capital Markets Act provides for the possibility of dual sanctions: imprisonment and criminal
fines. Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 447. For tier one violations, fines equal treble damages—
three times the amount of gains acquired or loss avoided. Id. This treble damage concept should be
expanded to violations under tiers two through four, though it may not always be easy to calculate the
amount of gains or loss, depending on the violation type.
71
Id. art. 444(13).
72
Id. art. 443.
67
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corporate entity for which the individual is working presents a challenging
legal issue.73
The tripartite statutes have one section in common—dual penalty
clauses. 74 Under the clause, if an individual violates the obligations or
prohibitions under applicable statutes, the corporate entity shall also be held
responsible for a fine.75 If the corporate entity breaches its obligation under
the applicable statutes, the corporate entity as well as individuals shall be
subject to criminal sanctions.76 This type of clause is common to almost
every regulatory statute in Korea,77 but their desirability and scope remains
controversial. 78 Because a corporation is a hypothetical legal creation,
corporate criminal liability due to individual misconduct creates a more
mysterious concept; some scholars argue the individual must bear the blame,
while others rely on respondeat superior to implicate the corporation.79
The dual penalty clauses under the tripartite statutes raise the question
of whether a corporate entity could or should be subject to criminal
sanctions, and if so, when and how.80 Despite many discussions about the
desirability or theoretical possibility of corporate criminal liability,
corporations are, in reality and by nature, only subject to a fine. 81 The
practical issue is under what conditions a corporate entity should be held
responsible for an individual’s conduct. In general, corporations are liable
73

See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Sanctioning Corporations, 19 J. L. & POL’Y 15, 19 (2010).
See Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 68(2); Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 448; Insurance
Business Act, supra note 28, art. 208.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
MINISTRY OF LEGISLATION, REVIEW STANDARDS OF STATUTES 492-99 (2006).
78
See infra note 83.
79
See, e.g., Susanne Beck, Meditating the Different Concepts of Corporate Criminal Liability in
England and Germany, 11 GERMAN L.J. 1093, 1110 (2010); Elizabeth A. Plimpton & Danielle Walsh,
Corporate Criminal Liability, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 331, 332 (2010); Abigail H. Lipman, Corporate
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 359, 361-65 (2009).
80
Some commentators advocate for limits on corporate criminal liability. See, e.g., John Hasnas,
The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1329 (2009); COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION, 2006 INTERIM REPORT SCORECARD 13
(2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/2006_Scorecard.pdf; Andrew Weissmann, A New
Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319, 1319-24 (2007) (“[T]he Justice
Department [should] revise its prosecutorial guidelines so that firms are only prosecuted in exceptional
circumstances of pervasive culpability throughout all offices and ranks.”). Other scholars support some
form of criminal liability for corporations. See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1482 (2009) (“corporations are not, fundamentally,
fictional entities”); Barry J. Pollack, Time to Stop Living Vicariously: A Better Approach to Corporate
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1393, 1413 (2009) (suggesting collective criminal intent
approach).
81
The liquidation of a business or the temporary suspension of its license is, in effect, the same as a
death sentence or imprisonment for an individual; such measures, however, are not penal sanctions, but
administrative sanctions.
74
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for the acts of employees if the employees are acting within the scope of
their employment for the benefit of the corporation.82 The tricky question is
whether the intent of the individual should be automatically imputed to the
corporation, without the corporation’s own negligence being a factor. The
dual penalty clauses in many administrative laws used to have no reference
to this issue. 83 After the Korean Constitutional Court rendered unlimited
dual penalty clauses unconstitutional in several cases,84 however, new words
were added to the effect that a corporate entity is responsible only if it fails
to exercise due care over the supervision of the relevant matter.85 This new
law compels corporate entities to use due diligence in order to avoid
criminal sanctions.
In addition, the tripartite statutes are unclear as to whether an
individual or a corporate entity should be held responsible for having aided
or abetted other companies that violated legal prohibitions or demands.86 A
traditional judicially-imposed theory is that criminal sanctions based on
regulatory administrative statutes can be imposed on aiders and abettors to
the same extent as principals; this is unlike the weaker liability for aiders and
abettors found in the Criminal Act. 87 Such exceptional treatment for
regulatory administrative law violators, however, should be clearly grounded
in statute, not judicial interpretation. Furthermore, it is doubtful that
criminal sanctions based on regulatory administrative statutes should be
distinguished from the crimes under the Criminal Act. 88 If aiders and
abettors are generally responsible under the Criminal Act,89 and corporate
entities are also responsible for individuals under the dual penalty clause,90
82
See Beale, supra note 80, at 1488 (noting that in the United States, the legal ground for civil
corporate responsibility for a single employee’s actions is respondeat superior).
83
For example, art. 68(2) of the Banking Act was revised on May 17, 2010 to silence discussions
about constitutionality of uniform dual penalty clauses.
84
See, e.g., Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2008 HUNGA10, Jul. 30, 2009; see also Change Seok
Park, A Study on the Judgment of Unconstitutionality on the Joint Penal Provisions, 16 J. SOC. SCI. 149
(2010); Byung-Sun Cho, Corporate Criminal Liability in Recently Revised Joint Penal Provisions, 21
CRIM. POL’Y 351 (2009).
85
See, e.g., Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 448 (requiring failure of due care for corporate
criminal liability); Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 68(2) (same); Insurance Business Act, supra note 28,
art. 208 (same).
86
Compare Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000DO90, Jan. 25, 2001 (rejecting accomplice liability for
insider trading) with S. Ct., 2001DO4947, Jul. 26, 2002 (recognizing accomplice liability for price
manipulation).
87
See Hyongbup [Criminal Act], Act No. 293, Sept. 18, 1953, amended by Act No. 7623, Jul. 29,
2005, art. 32 [hereinafter Criminal Act] (providing for reduced penalties for accomplices).
88
See Keun-Woo Lee, Address at Korea Criminal Law Study Group: A Critical Analysis on
Administrative Criminal Law Theory (2009). See also Kwan Hoon Kwak, The Problem and Improvement
of Administrative Regulations on Unlawful Corporate Acts, 19 K. MGMT. L. 75 (2008).
89
See Criminal Act, supra note 87, arts. 31-32.
90
See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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then prosecutors may be able to argue for a higher degree of liability for
corporate criminals than for individuals under the tripartite statutes. Because
the Korean Constitution outlaws double jeopardy and ensures the right to a
fair trial,91 these acts may push the limits of constitutionality.
3.

Investigative Procedure

As discussed above, the Financial Services Commission, the
Securities and Futures Commission, and the Financial Supervisory Services
have the authority to investigate and determine market misconduct. 92 For
unfair transactions and certain other types of misbehavior in the capital
market, the Securities and Futures Commission has the authority to
determine the ultimate measures to be imposed on rule-violating investment
banks. 93 At the same time, banks and insurance companies are subject to the
sanctions imposed by the Financial Services Commission. Thus, the
relationship between the Financial Services Commission and the Securities
and Futures Commission is not always clear.
Even if the violators are investigated and indicted by the Public
Prosecutor’s Office, Financial Supervisory Services would perform the
initial phase of the investigation as a matter of practice.94 Table 4 illustrates
the volume and outcome of investigations performed by the Financial
Supervisory Services for the past several years.
[TABLE 4] DISPOSAL OF CASES
Year

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Notice to
Prosecutor’s
Office
186
132
138
115
142

Orders to return
short windfall profits
56
24
50
35
16

Source: Financial Supervisory Services

Warnings,
etc.

17
9
14
7
18
2009 YEARBOOK

Total number
of cases
259
165
202
157
176

However, the Seoul Central District Court recently held that Financial
Supervisory Services officials had no authority to prepare legally valid
91

Daehanminkuk Hunbeob [Constitution] arts. 12-13, 27.
Financial Services Commission Act, see supra note 39, art. 17(4); supra notes 42-43 and
accompanying text.
93
Financial Services Commission Act, supra note 39, arts. 19-23; Capital Markets Act, supra note
16, art. 439.
94
A recent investigation of a corporation by the public prosecutor’s office is an exception to the
general practice.
92
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interrogatories at the request of the Securities and Futures Commission,
because the officials cannot be regarded as special police.95 However, it
seems legitimate and reasonable to support the investigatory authority of the
Financial Supervisory Services, as it is the most important organization that
has the necessary expertise on the capital market, and thus should be
responsible for the initial phase of the investigation. One solution would be
to designate the appropriate Financial Supervisory Services officials as
special police. Another solution would be to add procedural safeguards to
the Capital Markets Act relating to the Financial Supervisory Services’
investigative procedures.
B.

Administrative Sanctions

For less serious violations, the Financial Services Commission, upon
investigation, can issue administrative orders in addition to, or instead of
criminal sanctions.96 Such orders can be addressed to the firms and/or the
individuals.97 If revocation of a business license is comparable to a death
sentence for an individual, suspension of license is equivalent to
imprisonment. Furthermore, suspension of a business license can cause
more substantial economic loss to the business entity than a fine.
Accordingly, administrative sanctions can be more effective and less costly
for enforcement than criminal sanctions.
1.

Revocation or Suspension of Licenses

The Financial Services Commission can issue various orders to a
financial investment business that has violated the Capital Markets Act.98
The most devastating order the agency may issue is the revocation of a
business license.99 The Capital Markets Act lists eight specific grounds for
imposing such a measure100 in order to prevent abuse of enforcement. If a
business’ licenses are revoked, the business entity must be liquidated. 101
95

Seoul Central District Court [Seoul C. Dist. Ct.], 2010 KOHAP 11, Jan. 28, 2011.
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 420-22.
97
See generally Regulations on Capital Market Investigation Matters, FSC Public Notice No. 200915, amended by FSC Public Notice No. 2010-26, Schedule 2 (Sep. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Reg. Inv.]
(providing a formula to calculate the amount of civil fines); Regulations on Audits and Sanctions of
Financial Institutions, FSC Public Notice No. 2000-31, amended by FSC Public Notice No. 2010-38 (Nov.
12, 2010) [hereinafter Reg. A&S].
98
See Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 420-22, 428, 429.
99
Id. art. 420(1).
100
Id. Items include fraud, violation of conditions for a license, doing business during the suspension
period, and failure to fulfill an FSC corrective or cease and desist order. Id.
101
Id. art. 420(2).
96
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Foreign financial investment business entities are also subject to the same
sanctions, but on different grounds.102
Because revocation of licenses can be a death sentence to a
corporation’s existence, the Financial Services Commission is required to
have formal hearings before issuing this sentence. 103 For less serious
violations, the Financial Services Commission may: 1) suspend all or part of
a business for up to six months; 2) transfer trust contracts; 3) correct or
suspend business activities in violation; 4) make a public announcement of
the sanctions; 104 5) issue a warning; 6) issue a reprimand; or 7) issue
miscellaneous sanctions.105 Due to the Administrative Procedure Act, these
measures also require notice and a hearing.106 As long as due process is
secured, business license-related sanctions are desirable for efficiency and
should be utilized more often than criminal sanctions. This would ultimately
help financial institutions continue business with their customers. The issue
is then how to ensure procedural protection for the customers.
2.

Civil Fines

Civil fines were introduced into the Korean legal system as part of the
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act in 1980.107 Based on the Act, the
Korea Fair Trade Commission has established a new financial model for
developing additional revenue sources by imposing astronomically high civil
fines for the past several years.108 Table 5 shows the enormity of civil fines
perpetuated by the Fair Trade Commission.
102

Id. art. 421.
Id. art. 423.
104
Regarding the constitutionality of mandatory public apology, see Const. Ct., 89HUNMA160, Apr.
1, 1991 (holding the public announcement of illegal conduct and a sanction of mandatory apology are not
unconstitutional).
105
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 420(3). FSC may be able to sign with the applicable
financial institutions a confirmation about the improvement of situations or a memorandum of
understanding to rectify the wrongs. Reg. A&S, supra note 97, arts. 20-22. In the case of financial
institutions in default, FSC also has the authority to take a variety of measures, including a petition for
bankruptcy pursuant to the Law on Restructuring of Financial Institutions. Id.; see also S. Ct.,
2004DOO13219, Jul. 28, 2006 (denying the administrative proceeding about the legality of such petition).
106
Haengjungjulcha beob [Administrative Procedure Act], art. 3. Further procedural protections
generally apply for those facing administrative sanctions. See Reg. Inv., supra note 97, art. 36 (requiring
FSC to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard).
107
Hae-Shik Park, The Legal Character of Civil Penalties on Unlawful Assistance under MRFTA, 8
K. COMP. L. STUDY 225, 231-32 (2002). This article uses the term “civil fine” to mean a severe penalty,
while reserving “administrative fine” to refer to a sanction for minor misbehavior. “Civil fines” are
different from “enforcement penalties,” which are monetary sanctions issued when an agency’s specific
order to a violator is not followed.
108
Korea Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”), Status Report to National Assembly, 28 (Oct. 5, 2010).
The amount of civil fines tends to increase rapidly except for during election periods. Id. For January
103
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[TABLE 5] KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION CIVIL FINES RECORD
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Jan.-Aug. 2010
Total

Total Amount Collected
Through Civil Fines Imposed
(KRW Million)
36,308
259,063
175,261
423,398
272,869
371,035
458,762
1,996,696

Number of Cases
91
274
157
326
141
78
39
1,106

Source: KFTC, Status Report to National Assembly, 28 (Oct. 5, 2010)

Civil fines are imposed in the case of almost every violation of the
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act.109 Other government agencies,
such as the Financial Services Commission and the Korea Communications
Commission, have followed suit.110 Civil fines are sometimes offered as an
alternative to the revocation of a business license or as levies on pollution.111
Civil fines have become a favored sanction under all administrative
statutes.112
Strong criticism of and legal challenges against excessive civil fines
have been unsuccessful.113 In reality, the economic effect of civil fines is the
same as criminal fines, and it was a thorny issue whether procedural
safeguards under the Korean Criminal Procedural Act should apply for civil
fines. 114 Legal challenges based on double jeopardy, due process,
through August 2010, though the number of cases was less than the annual average, the total amount of
civil fines far exceeded the total in 2009. Id.
109
See Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, amended by Act No.
8635, Aug. 3, 2007, arts. 6, 17, 24(2), 28, 31(2).
110
See Press Release, FSC, Study on Civil Fines on Unfair Trade Practices in Capital Markets (Mar.
4, 2010). In addition to FSC, Korea Communications Commission (“KCC”) has frequently levied civil
fines to telecommunications companies. See, e.g., Press Release, KCC, Civil Fines on Three Wireless Data
Service Telcos, (Dec. 2, 2010). The amount of fines in this case was KRW 8.4 billion, id., which is modest
compared to the huge sales revenues of the three oligopolistic telecommunications companies.
111
See, e.g., Water Quality and Ecosystem Preservation Act, Act No. 7459, Mar. 31, 2005, amended
by Act No. 10615, art. 41.
112
Ba Young-Kil Bae, A Study on the Administrative Money Penalty System, 3 K. PUB. L. STUDY
241, 246 (2002). In 2001, 51 statutes had civil penalty clauses; as of Apr. 2002, the number of statutes was
75. Id.
113
The initial purpose was to deprive the violators of the illegal profits, but later fines were
introduced as punitive sanctions. Sang Kook Han, Money Penalties for Tax Crimes, 76 FIN. FORUM 6, 12
(2003). As to the constitutionality of civil fines, see Const. Ct., 99HUNGA18, May 31, 2001, in which the
Constitutional Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of civil fines.
114
Byung-Duck Chung, A Study on the Legal Characterization of the Penalty Surcharges in
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, 15 K. MGMT. L. EV. 465, 484 (2005). Another form of fine is
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presumption of innocence, uncontrolled discretion, or the proportionality
principle have been futile.115 Alternatively, other milder procedural control
methods have been discussed, such as providing explanations of the
reasoning behind decisions; 116 refining the relevant market and violation
periods; 117 and implementing a two-factor formula assessing impact and
materiality.118 These have been proposed and partially implemented by the
Korea Fair Trade Commission. 119 For now, any further protections for
alleged violators are not de lege lata [the law as it exists], but de lege
ferenda [the law as it should be].
Civil fines became part of the enforcement mechanism relating to
financial services market crimes when the Securities and Exchanges Act and
the Banking Act were revised in 2001120 and 2002,121 respectively.122 Civil
fines for financial market crimes are tightly regulated compared to
regulation under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act; the illegal
conduct subject to civil fines is restricted. Regarding capital markets, only
certain violations are subject to civil fines: violations regarding related party
transactions,123 registration statements,124 tender offer filings,125 and periodic

the enforcement penalty, a monetary sanction issued when an agency’s specific order to a violator is not
followed. Since 1991, when the Construction Act introduced this system, it has spread to 21 other statutes
by 2008, including adoption by the Banking Act. See Kwan Hoon Kwak, supra note 88, at 87.
115
Cons. Ct., 2001HUNGA25, Jul. 24, 2003; S. Ct., 2000TII6206, Feb. 9, 2001; S. Ct.,
2006DOO4554, Jul. 12, 2007; S. Ct., 2001DOO6517, Apr. 23, 2004; S. Ct., 2001DOO7220, Mar. 12,
2004; S. Ct., 2006DOO4226, Feb. 15, 2008; see also Sam-Hyun Chun, The Legal Problems of Surcharges
on the Unfair Trade Act, 21 K. COMM. CASE STUDY 203 (2008).
116
Hae-Shik Park, supra note 107, at 247.
117
See Jinsoo Yoo & Namhoon Kwon, Policies Against Collusion: Current Trends and Critical
Issues, 15 IND. ORG. STUDY 83, 96-99 (2007) (discussing evaluation criteria to determine the termination
date of a collusion).
118
Taehi Hwang, A Legal Study on Setting the Basic Amount of Surcharges in Relation to the Cartel,
50 SEOUL L.J. 401, 402 (2009).
119
See Notice on Detailed Standards of Calculation of Civil Fines, KFTC Notification No. 2001-6
(Jun. 1, 2001), amended by KFTC Notification No. 2010-9 (Oct. 20, 2010).
120
See Jeunggwongeorae beob [Securities and Exchanges Act], Act No. 972, Apr. 1, 1962, amended
by Act No. 8985, Mar. 21, 2008, art. 206(11-16) [hereinafter Securities and Exchanges Act]; Capital
Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 428.
121
See Banking Act, supra note 16, arts. 65(3-11).
122
Several additional statutes provide for civil fines as enforcement mechanisms. See Insurance
Business Act, supra note 28, art. 196; Sangho Jeochook Eunhangbup [Mutual Saving Bank Law], Act No.
2333, Aug. 2, 1972, amended by Act. No. 10303, Nov. 18, 2010, arts. 38(2)-(8); Yeoshin Chunmoon
Gwemyungupbup [Credit Facility Specialty Business Law], Act No. 5374, Aug. 28, 1997, amended by Act
No. 10564, Apr. 7, 2011, art. 58; Gwemyung Jeejoo Hoesabup [Finance Holding Company Law], Act No.
6274, Oct. 23, 2000, amended by Act No. 10361, Dec. 9, 2010, art. 64.
123
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 428(1), 428(34). Here, a civil fine is an alternative to
suspension of business activities under Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 420(2).
124
Id. arts. 429(1)(119), 429(1)(122)-(123).
125
Id. art. 429(2)(142).
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disclosure.126 Only in a case involving malice or gross negligence will the
context, degree, period, frequency, and unlawful gains be weighed in
determining the amount of a fine. 127 Relevant parties shall have the
opportunity to present their opinions or materials.128 One may object to such
an order within 30 days to the Financial Services Commission, in which case
the Commission has up to 90 days for reexamination. 129 The Financial
Services Commission follows a similar procedure when implementing the
Banking Act and the Insurance Business Act.130
The civil fine procedures for financial market crimes leave a lot of
room for improvement in terms of substance and procedure. Table 6 shows
the overall schematics of civil fines, showing the violations subject to civil
fines are inconsistent among banks, financial investment firms, and
insurance companies. The differences in the nature of banking, insurance,
and investment banking do not justify such an inconsistency and thus the
situation should be rectified. 131 In addition, the size of the penalties are
inadequate considering their impact on an investor’s trust in capital markets,
especially when compared to the size of fines under the Monopoly
Regulation and Fair Trade Act.132 The fines should be increased so violators
are paying more when they are fined. Finally, the prior notice and hearing
procedure should be more formally regulated to ensure procedural
safeguards are in place.133

126

Id. arts. 429(3)(159), 429(3)(160)-(161).
Id. art. 430.
128
Id. art. 431.
129
Id. art. 432.
130
See Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 65(5)-(6); Insurance Business Act, supra note 28, art. 196(4).
131
The fines and their methods of calculation vary greatly across the various financial services fields.
See Reg. A&S, supra note 97; Reg. Inv., supra note 97.
132
Yong-Chan Lee, Monetary Sanctions on Financial Institutions in Korea: Problems and Proposals
for Improvement, 9 CHOONGANG L. REV. 537, 557-64 (2007). Lee argues that the number of minor
violations subject to administrative fines should be expanded, while civil penalties could be more
restrained. Id. However, the misdeeds subject to civil fines seem to be serious enough to warrant steep
financial penalties. Id. The real regulatory policy goal seems to be consistency among three business lines.
Id.
133
See Young Shin Yoon, Price Manipulation by Trading, 2 K. J. SEC. L. 1 (2001) (critiquing
subjective standards for sanctions); see also Regulations on Committee Meeting and Case Management,
KFTC Public Notice No. 2000-8, amended by KFTC Public Notice No. 2009-64 (Dec. 7, 2009) [hereinafter
Regulations on Case Management].
127
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[TABLE 6] CIVIL FINES UNDER THE BANKING ACT, CAPITAL
MARKETS ACT, & INSURANCE BUSINESS ACT
Banks

Insurance
Companies
Financial
Investment

Grounds
Loan limit to one entity, limit
on equity investm’t, loan limit
to large shareholders, limit on
investm’t in large shareholder’s
equity, limit on investm’t in
real estate, etc.; influence by
large shareholders (18 items)
Kickback, limit on asset
managem’t, transaction with
large shareholders (5 items)
Transaction with or investm’t
in large shareholders,
shareholders, investm’t in large
shareholders, misrepresentation
in registration statem’t, tender
offer report, periodic or
continuous disclosure

Basis
Excess
over limit

Rates
7/10-7/160
(5 step)

Excess,
kickback

Same
(except
kickback)
3/100
10/100
(disclosure)

Excess,
offer
amount,
daily trade
volume

Factors
+/-50%
Duration, track record,
damage/profit, motive,
remedy, report, due
care.

Serious violation
(impact on operating
profits or equity, cash
flow, contingent
liability), cooperation,
track record, voluntary
report, loss to
investors

Source: Banking Act, Capital Markets Act, and Insurance Business Act

In practice, fines have not been prevalent. For the first half of 2010,
the Securities and Futures Commission filed 89 cases based on disclosure
violations, among which only eight cases resulted in civil fines (totaling
KRW 471 million).134 As for banks and insurance companies, the Financial
Services Commission issued eleven civil fines in 2010, which ranged from
KRW 23 million to 4.5 billion.135 The trend seems to be moving towards
imposing civil fines more frequently.136 Nevertheless, the fines themselves
are meager compared to the amount of civil fines imposed by the KFTC, as
shown in Table 5, above. The basis amount should be the amount involved
in the illegal transaction rather than the fixed amount stipulated in the rules.
134
Information
on
Regulatory
Reform
Resolutions,
SFC,
http://www.fsc.go.kr/info/con_stcc_list.jsp?menu=7220200&bbsid=BBS0025 (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).
Of the remaining cases, three resulted in criminal indictments, one in a recommendation of management
termination, nine in administrative fines (minor fines of lesser quantity than the more serious “civil fines”),
and the remaining sixty-eight in warnings. Id.
135
Sanctions
Information,
FSC,
http://www.fsc.go.kr/info/con_sanc_list.jsp?menu=7220300&bbsid=BBS0122 (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).
In 2010, 86 banks were warned while in 35 cases executives were reprimanded. Id.
136
In 2010, SFC adopted sanctions on disclosure violations six times and all those resolutions
included civil fines. See, e.g., Press Release, FSS, Sanctions on Disclosure Violations (Nov. 24, 2010),
available
at
http://www.fss.or.kr/kr/nws/nbd/bodobbs_v.jsp?seqno=14755&no=38&gubun=01&menu=nws020100. In
contrast, in 2007 SFC adopted sanctions on disclosure violations six times and four resolutions included
civil fines. See Press Releases, FSS, http://www.fss.or.kr/kr/nws/nbd/bodobbs_l.jsp?gubun=01 (search for
“disclosure violations”).
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Furthermore, the rates of fines should go up in order for the civil fines to
work effectively as sanctions and deterrents.137
3.

Censure of Executives

In addition to corporate responsibility—or as an alternative to it—
executives can be held responsible on an individual level. The Financial
Services Commission has the authority to directly issue censures to
executives, while employees are subject to similar sanctions at the request of
the Financial Services Commission to the firm. 138 The censures include
termination, 139 suspension for up to six months, warning, 140 reprimand,
notice, and other miscellaneous measures. 141 One possible censure for
employees is reduction of compensation. As in the revocation of a business
license, termination or a request for termination requires a hearing.142 The
Financial Services Commission must maintain records of such censure,143
and the individual may file an objection with the Financial Services
Commission.144
Under the regulatory scheme, while the Financial Services
Commission does not have direct authority over the executives or other
employees of financial institutions, it nonetheless may request financial
institutions take disadvantageous measures to remedy managerial
mistakes.145 Therefore, it seems more desirable to have the shareholders of
financial institutions consider the future of the incumbent management.

137
But see J. Karpoff, D. Lee & G. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. &
QUAN. ANA. 581-611 (2008) (arguing in the context of the United States that market-level enforcements
such as the loss of market value when news of misconduct is reported can be more effective than civil
fines).
138
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 422; Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 54.
139
As to the effect of termination, see Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 18(1)(9). See also Capital
Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 24; Capital Markets Act E.D. supra note 48, art. 27. For five years, they
cannot be officers of other financial institutions.
140
As to the challenge to the legality of warning, see S. Ct., 2003DOO14765, Feb. 17, 2005.
141
Dong-Jun Choi, A Study of Current Situation and Legal Issues about the Disciplinary Warning
Against Officers, 4 K. J. FIN. L. 129, 138 (2007).
142
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 423.
143
Id. art. 424.
144
Id. art. 425.
145
Article 54 of the Banking Act, supra note 16, provides the following reasons for such an action:
1) officers fail to comply with Financial Services Commission orders; or 2) officers damage the sound
management of banks. FSC may request the suspension of an officer, or recommend that dismissal be
considered by shareholders. Id.
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Private Enforcement

Although the regulatory agencies are primarily responsible for the
protection of investors and efficient operation of the market system, they
should be cautious not to be overly intrusive. With too much agency
authority and responsibility, paternalistic protectionism could outgrow
market-based management. Additionally, the regulatory agencies could not
afford the financial cost of great supervisory responsibility. Consequently,
private enforcement should be a pivotal component of the enforcement
mechanisms.
1.

Pre-Litigation Mechanisms

In disputes involving financial transactions, alternative dispute
resolution fits the situation best because the judicial branch lacks expertise.
Furthermore, solutions might have to come from collective remedial
measures such as an establishment of funds. Prospective measures, such as
revision of general terms and conditions, might be desirable. Rituals in
court on a case-by-case basis do not always provide the best solution. Thus,
using pre-litigation mechanisms is usually preferable, though this may
depend on the situation.
Mediation is one such solution.146 Although mediation is not binding,
and thus of limited effect, the Financial Supervisory Services has a standing
Dispute Resolution Committee.147 The most troublesome issue is whether
mediation is appropriate for a dispute, in light of the mandatory nature of
financial regulations. For example, if a consumer argues about suitability or
misrepresentation, whether it would be subject to mediation is not clear.148
In addition, there is a potential conflict as a regulatory agency might be
partially responsible for a dispute. Nonetheless, the Financial Supervisory
Services has been extremely successful and active in addressing consumer

146
Sangsoo Kim, Financial Dispute and ADR: The Comparison between Korea and Japan, 7 K. J.
FIN. L. 145, 165-67 (2010).
147
Financial Services Commission Act, supra note 39, arts. 51-57.
148
See Financial Services Commission Act, supra note 39, art. 53(1)(2) (providing for the option of
rejection by the FSC).
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disputes involving financial intermediaries in Korea. 149 Thus, the Financial
Supervisory Services has a plan to make mediation mandatory prior to
litigation, and mediation unilaterally binding on the financial institutions.150
In addition to the Financial Supervisory Services, KRX operates the Market
Audit Committee, which has dispute resolution functions.151 KOFIA also
runs a dispute resolution center for its members.152
Arbitration can be more effective than mediation, as arbitration
decisions are binding. Unlike in the United States, however,153 most Korean
contracts do not contain arbitration clauses in standard financial transaction
documents.154 This might be partly due to the lack of expertise in arbitration
at KRX and KOFIA.155 Even if we assume the relevant institutions do have
the capability to arbitrate disputes, it remains unclear to what extent these
disputes can be resolved by arbitration. For example, whether churning,
149

Press Release, FSS, 2009 Disputes Statistics (Mar. 5, 2010).
Banks &
Financial
Life Ins.
Damage Ins.
Consumer Fin.
Investment
Filed, 2009
6,976
2,225
10,661
10,212
Mediation Acc’d,
50.2%
37.1%
43.7%
2009
Filed, 2008
5,200
1,163
7,393
7,269
Filed, 2007
2,020
561
7,603
6,895
Filed, 2006
2,154
470
8,681
7,084
Filed, 2005
3,861
424
7,631
6,766
See Press Release, FSS, 2009 Litigation Statistics (Mar. 11, 2010).
Out of 28,988 cases filed with the FSS, 1,656 suits were filed with courts. 1,435 litigations were filed
by financial institutions, not by consumers. Out of 1,656 suits, 478 cases were settled.
Banks, etc.
Financial
Life Ins.
Damage Ins.
Investment
Court cases
82
56
161
1,357
Plaintiff FIG
30.5%
44.6%
73.3%
93.4%
150
FSS, 2009 Litigation Statistics, supra note 149 (citing cases in Germany and the United
Kingdom); see also Bill 1809789 proposed by Cong. MHCho, et al., on Nov. 3, 2010 to amend the
Financial Services Commission Act. Art. 56 of the bill would require mediation before a suit is filed.
151
See Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 405. More information is available at Market
Oversight
Committee,
KRX,
http://www.krx.co.kr/m11/m11_1/m11_1_5/m11_1_5_5/UHPKOR11001_05_05.html (last visited May 13,
2011).
152
See KOREAN FINANCIAL INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION (“KOFIA”), http://www.ksda.or.kr/ (last
visited Apr. 10, 2011).
153
See Cheol Han, Securities Arbitration as a Means of Securities Disputes Resolution, 22 K. COMM.
L. STUDY 393 (2003).
154
See, e.g., Standard Terms and Conditions for Customer Contracts, DONGBU SECURITIES,
http://www.dongbuhappy.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). Art. 22 on dispute resolution, however,
provides for the customer’s right for mediation. Id.
155
Joongjae beob [Arbitration Law], Act No. 6083, Dec.31, 1999. The Arbitration Law was the first
introduction of modern arbitration processes in Korea.
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unauthorized trading, or misrepresentation issues in violation of the Capital
Markets Act should be arbitrated or not is unclear. Nonetheless, arbitration
is a dispute resolution process with the potential to be more widely adopted
in Korea.
2.

Litigation for Compensatory Damages

In disputes with banks or insurance companies, account holders or
insurance buyers can recover damages from the institutions if a breach of
contract occurs.156 Likewise, dealers and brokers can compensate capital
market investors with damages. For overtrading 157 and unauthorized
trading,158 Korean courts tend to allow such litigation liberally, although the
amount of damages awarded is usually limited.159
In cases of misrepresentation, insider trading, and unfair trading, the
Capital Markets Act stipulates a private cause of action. 160
Misrepresentation or omission of representation on material items in a
registration statement would lead the issuers, directors,161 and advisors (such
as accountants162 and underwriters163) to be jointly and severally liable for
damages.164 They are also responsible for damages due to misrepresentation
or failure to represent major items in periodic and continuous disclosure
documents. 165 Anyone charged with insider trading is also liable for
damages to investors who experienced loss in connection with the crime.166

156

Min beob [Civil Code], Act No. 461, Feb. 22, 1958, amended by Act No. 10549, Mar. 7, 2011, art.

390.
157
Kim, Yongjae, Suggestions to the Reform of the Churning Regulation under the Capital Market
and Financial Investment Services Act, 8 K. J. SEC. L.117 (2007).
158
Gi-Hun Kwon, The Restriction on Discretionary Transactions in Futures Trading, 15 K. COMM.
CASE STUDY 329, 353-355 (2003); Bok-ki Hong, A Claim for Damages Caused by Discretionary Trading
of Stocks and Unreasonable Recommendation by Brokers, 15 K. COMM. CASE STUDY 131 (2003).
159
E.g., Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 90NA21577, Jan. 23, 1991.
160
See generally KSLA, STUDY ON SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF SECURITIES-RELATED DAMAGE
CLAIMS (2003).
161
S. Ct., 2006DA68636, Sep. 11, 2008 (regarding Daewoo directors); Seoul High Ct.,
2006NA14648, Sep. 13, 2006.
162
Seoul C. Dist. Ct., 2003KAHAP77160, May 19, 2005 (regarding the CPA firm of POSNIK); S.
Ct., 97DA26555, Oct. 22, 1999 (regarding the CPA firm of Korea Steel Pipe).
163
Seoul District Court, 2000NA32740, Nov. 23, 2000 (regarding the underwriter of Hanil
Securities); Seoul High Ct., 2000NA10828/10835, Jan. 9, 2001 (regarding the underwriter of Yent).
164
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 125; Securities and Exchanges Act, supra note 120, art.
14. As to a plaintiff’s standing, see Dae-Sub Kang, Standing to Sue Claims under Section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act, 19 K. COMM. CASE STUDY 219 (2006).
165
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 162; Securities and Exchanges Act, supra note 120, art.
186(5); S. Ct., 2002DA38521, Oct. 11, 2002 (regarding Daewoo Electronics).
166
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 174; Securities and Exchanges Act, supra note 120, arts.
14, 188(3); see Seoul High Ct., 94NA21162, Jun. 14, 1995 (limiting plaintiffs to contemporaneous

508

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 20 NO. 3

Any unfair trader, including one who has manipulated the market price, is
also liable for the damages arising out of such trading.167
3.

Class Action

After plenty of debate over the pros and cons of class action
lawsuits,168 the Securities-Related Class Action Act (“Securities Class Action
Act”) passed the National Assembly in 2004, becoming effective January 1,
2005.169 As for the listed companies, whose assets are less than KRW 2
trillion, it applies to actions after Jan. 1, 2007.170 Large listed companies
also had a two-year reconciliation period. 171 Though the Securities Class
Action Act became fully effective on January 1, 2007, not a single class
action had been filed until recently. On April 13, 2009, the first Korean class
action suit was filed against Jinsung TEC for its failure to disclose loss from
derivative trading in the first half of the year until it filed its third quarter
report; the parties subsequently settled. 172 Due in part to a lack of
compensation for the class representative’s time and efforts, many expect the
Securities Class Action Act to become a dead letter. Excessive filing is a
phantom horror, as there have been only two suits filed.

investors); Dae Sub Kang, Case Comments, 7 K. COMM. CASE STUDY 359 (1996) (discussing formulation
of damages).
167
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 177, 179; Securities and Exchanges Act, supra note 120,
art. 188(5). Kim, Joo-Young et al., Calculation of Damages in Stock Price Manipulation Cases, 2 K. J.
SEC. L. 111 (2001). Seoul High Ct., 2000NA22456, Dec. 5, 2000 (deeming the highest price in the prior
six months to be the market price).
168
See, e.g., Jong Seok Shin, A Study on Securities-Related Class Action, 34 K. L. STUD. 295 (2009);
Jin-Yi Choi, A Study on the Issues and Improvement of the Class Action Law Concerned with Securities, 23
K. ENT. L. REV. 299 (2009); Jung Hoo Oh, Critical View on Class Action from Civil Procedural Law, 5 K.
J. SEC. L. 255 (2004); Jun-Seob Yi, Issues on Reform on Legal Liability System in Securities Exchange Act
after the Introduction of Class Action, 4 K. J. SEC. L. 1 (2003).
169
Securities-Related Class Action Act, Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 10208,
Mar. 31, 2010 [hereinafter Securities Class Action Act].
170
Id., amended by Act No. 7387, Mar. 10, 2005, art. 3.
171
Id. art. 4.
172
Sung Tae Kim, A Study on Representative Parties in the Securities Class Action Law, 24
SOONGSIL. L. REV. 195 (2010). Public notices of Suwon District Court decisions to permit class actions,
settlement agreement, etc. are available at Securities Class Action Lawsuits, SUPREME COURT OF KOREA,
http://www.scourt.go.kr/stock/stocklist_temp.jsp (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). More recently, on Jan. 7, 2010,
the second class action suit was filed as Case No. 10GAHAP1604 against Royal Bank of Canada. See the
public notice of the class action on the above Supreme Court website bulletin board (last visited Apr. 28,
2011). The cause of action was the price manipulation of the equity-linked securities issued by Hanwha
Securities. As to these securities, Seoul Central District Court rendered a decision in favor of the buyers in
2009GAHAP90394, Jul. 1, 2010.
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It is proposed that limits on causes of action and legal representation
under the Securities Class Action Act be abolished.173 Currently, causes of
action are limited to misrepresentations in registration statement,
misrepresentations in periodic or continuous disclosure documents, insider
trading, and outside auditors’ liability.174 The current list of causes of action
for class actions should be expanded more broadly so that any massive
disputes such as product liability and other types of investor loss could be
resolved by class action. 175 In addition, the Securities Class Action Act
limits legal representation on three cases for three years.176 The restriction
on representation of plaintiffs in class actions should be immediately
abolished.
IV.

EX ANTE MEASURES

Korea should limit ex post facto measures on violators and utilize
more ex ante measures because they are always less costly and more
effective. Like infectious diseases, it is best to prevent legal disputes from
occurring through preventive means. Accordingly, Korean law calls on
financial institutions to take seemingly vigorous ex ante measures.177
A.

Compliance Officer

A compliance officer within a corporate organization is directly linked
to corporate governance issues. Within the basic structure of financial
institutions in Korea, the board has a “duty of care” to monitor business
operations. 178 For large financial investment companies, 179 the board is

173
Bill No. 1803630, which would delimit the restrictions on causes of action, is pending at the
National Assembly. Alternatively, another proposed bill would expand the causes of action available to
include product defects liability and other claims. See Bill No. 1801701.
174
Securities Class Action Act, supra note 169, art. 3.
175
For example, server computer downtime or disclosure of personal information by financial
institutions can be considered. Farmers Coop & Hyundai Capital Facing Collective Action, SEOUL NEWS,
Apr. 18, 2011, http://www.Seoul.co.kr.
176
Securities Class Action Act, supra note 169, art. 11(3).
177
The compliance concept was initially introduced into Korean law through the audit committee
concept. Sang beop [Amendment Law] Act No. 6086, Dec. 31, 1999, art. 415(2).
178
S. Ct., 2002DA60467/60474, Dec. 10, 2004 (regarding Dongbang Peregrin director purchasing
unguaranteed CP, buying back Midopa shares acquired in the name of third parties, and investing in preKOSDAQ shares); S. Ct., 2006DA68636, Sep. 11, 2008 (regarding Daewoo director for cooking books).
For the most recent discussions about duty of oversight in the United States, see MICHAEL D. GREENBERG,
RAND CENTER FOR CORPORATE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, DIRECTORS AS
GUARDIANS OF COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS WITHIN THE CORPORATE CITADEL (2010).
179
If the asset is KRWT or more, it is a large financial institution regardless of whether its shares are
floated or not. Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 25; Capital Markets Act E.D., supra note 48;
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required to have one-half or a majority of independent directors; three or
more non-standing, outsider directors 180 set up the director nomination
committee 181 and the audit committee, 182 which are independent of the
board. For smaller financial investment companies, a standing independent
auditor is required.183 They are all subject to outside audits for accounting
matters.184 Corporate governance of banks and insurance companies is the
same as for large investment companies.185 Notwithstanding this panoply of
gatekeepers, which is confusingly diverse, the compliance officer system
was introduced to financial institutions in 2000 in the midst of the Asian
financial crisis.186
The board of financial institutions is required to nominate a
compliance officer.187 His or her qualifications, such as work or research
experience, must be excellent. 188 To ensure independence, compliance
officers are prohibited from engaging in other business activities. 189
Compliance officers have the authority to request that management produce
Insurance Business Act, supra note 28, art. 15. As such, many life insurance companies are treated large
even before their demutualization.
180
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 25. As for the qualification of outside directors, see id.
art. 25(5).
181
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 25(2). One-half of the nomination committee must be
outside directors. Id.
182
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 26. Two-thirds must be outside directors. Id. One
member must have expertise in accounting. Id.
183
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 27. If the assets are less than KRW 100 billion, this
requirement is waived. Id. art. 20. Thus, “smaller financial institutions” refers to companies with assets
that are between KRW 100 billion and KRW 2 trillion. If the company has an audit committee, then a
standing auditor is not required.
184
Chushikhoesae oebugamsae gwanhan beopyul [Act on External Audits of Stock Companies], Act
No. 3297, Dec. 31, 1980, amended by Act No. 10303, May. 17, 2010, art. 2 [hereinafter External Audits
Act]. Possessing assets of KRW 10 billion or more triggers an audit. Id. Outside audits must be done by
certified accountants. Id.
185
Banking Act, supra note 16, arts. 22, 23, and 23-2; Insurance Business Act, supra note 28, arts.1516.
186
Jin Kuk Lee, Criminal Implications of Compliance as a Preventive Mechanism of Corporate
Crime, 21 K. CRIM. REV. 65 (2010); Seong-Ho Seo, et al., Review on Discussions on Establishing Internal
Control System Within Corporations Pursuant to Japanese Corporations Law, 24 K. ENT. L. STUDY 173
(2010); Jong-Mi Yoon, Study on the Internal Control System to Prevent Conflicts of Interest, 24 K. ENT. L.
STUDY 217 (2010); Byungseok Jeong, For the Generalization of Compliance Systems on Korean
Corporations, 26 K. COMM. L. STUDY 261 (2007).
187
Banking Act, supra note 16, art. 23-3; Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 28; Insurance
Business Act, supra note 28, art. 17. BYONG-JO MIN, ET AL, KOREA BANKING INSTITUTE, COMPLIANCE
OFFICER, 207-225 (2009) (stating that internal education on compliance is conducted once or twice a year
by most securities companies).
188
For example, qualifying factors for an insurance company’s compliance officer include: ten years
of finance working experience; five years of finance working experience with a master’s degree; or five
years of experience as a lawyer, certified public accountant, actuary or public official. Insurance Business
Act, supra note 28, art. 17(4).
189
Id. art 17(5).
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or submit information or documents, and are responsible for monitoring
compliance in order to report to the audit committee or standing auditor.190
Unfortunately, this inside gatekeeper does not appear to be
functioning. The compliance officer system is still ineffective and
perfunctory because the financial institutions are often managed by family
members of the founder, not by professional managers. 191 The only
remaining option to rectify the situation is to have the nominating committee
dominated by non-standing directors who are independent of the controlling
shareholders.192 In the end, financial institutions should work for the benefit
of the investors—the public.193
B.

Internal Control System

Another criterion for compliance is that financial institutions establish
an internal control system as required. Along with the compliance officer,
an internal control system was also introduced to financial institutions in
2000. Its coverage is extremely broad to include the following controls for
investment banking businesses:194 i) division of business and organizational
structure; ii) risk management guidelines for operation of proprietary and
investor assets; iii) standard operation procedure manual; iv) establishment
of efficient management information delivery system for decision making;
v) verification procedure for compliance and counter-measure procedure on
violations; vi) procedure and standards to prevent unfair trades, including
transaction reports; vii) procedure setting up internal control standards; viii)
appointment procedure of compliance officer; xi) cognizance and
management of conflicts; x) compliance procedure on voting rights
regarding collective assets or trust assets; and xi) selection of brokers and

190
Id. art 17(6). Article 17(8) also provides incentives for businesses to have effective compliance
programs, such as the waiver of audits, the shortening of audits, or the reduction of sanctions.
191
E.g., Jong-Mi Yoon, supra note 186.
192
Currently, the board has the authority to appoint the compliance officer. Insurance Business Act,
supra note 28, art. 17(3).
193
If a company is operated by controlling shareholders, independent directors are desirable only for
the protection of minority shareholders. Thus, one can argue that reliance on a director’s fiduciary duty
(with breaches remedied through litigation) would be more effective. See HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE 88 (17th ed. 2010) (noting there is no systematic evidence that independent directors do a better
job at protecting minority shareholder rights than non-independent directors).
194
Capital Markets Act E.D., supra note 48, art. 31. As for banks and insurance companies, see
Enforcement Decree of the Banking Act, Presidential Decree No. 15651, Feb. 20, 1998, amended by
Presidential Decree No. 21775, Oct. 29, 2009, art. 17(2) [hereinafter Banking Act E.D.]; Enforcement
Decree of the Insurance Business Act, Presidential Decree No. 18093, Aug. 27, 2003, amended by
Presidential Decree No. 21518, May 29, 2009, art. 22 [hereinafter Insurance Act E.D.].
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dealers for collective investment and trust assets. 195 The Financial
Supervisory Services, 196 KOFIA, 197 and Bank of Korea 198 offer various
standard forms and manuals.
In 2003, the Korean government expanded the mandatory internal
accounting control system to the companies subject to outside auditing,199
which was modeled on Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United
States. 200 Such a system must include: 1) cognizance, measurement,
classification, recording, and reports of accounting information; 2) control of
errors in accounting information and a rectification method; 3) periodic
checks and reconciliation of accounting information; 4) management of
books and records, with controls against falsification, modification, or
distortion; and 5) division of responsibility among management for the
production and disclosure of accounting information.201 A company’s board
is required to adopt the system, 202 which is to be disclosed to the public
investors. 203 Under the system, the CEO shall designate one standing
director as internal accounting system manager.204 The manager shall report
to the audit committee or auditor annually on the company’s operational
reality. 205 The outside auditor for accounting matters is also required to
report the status of the company to the board and attach its views to the
annual audit report.206 The CEO and the officer for public disclosure matters
are also required to certify that the company’s internal accounting control
system complies with legal requirements. 207 The Financial Supervisory
Services provided guidelines for a standard practice of internal accounting
195

Financial Investment Business Regulations, FSS Public Notice No. 2008-5, amended by FSS
Public Notice No. 2010-30 (Sep. 1, 2010).
196
FSS, http://www.fss.or.kr/kr/bbs/list.jsp?bbsid=1207388738482 (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
197
KOFIA, http://www.kofia.or.kr/kofia/index.cfm (last visited Apr.11, 2011).
198
BANK OF KOREA, http://dl.bok.or.kr/index.ax (last visited May 10, 2011).
199
See External Audits Act, supra note 184, art. 2(2). Companies with assets of less than KRW 100
billion are exempt.
200
15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2010).
201
Enforcement Decree of the Act on External Audits of Stock Companies, Presidential Decree No.
12939, Mar. 3, 1990, amended by Presidential Decree No. 2493, Nov. 15, 2010, art. 2(2) [hereinafter
External Audits Act E.D.]. Article 2(2) lists additional items to be covered by such a system: establishment
and amendment procedures; compliance procedures of management in producing and disclosing accounting
information; counter measures in response to a CEO who orders the production or disclosure of false
accounting information in violation of the system, and censure procedure for officers who violate the
system.
202
Id. art. 2(3)(1).
203
Id. art. 2(3)(3).
204
External Audits Act, supra note 184, art. 2(3).
205
Id. art. 2(4).
206
Id. arts. 2-3.
207
See Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 119; Capital Markets Act E.D., supra note 48, art.
124.
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control systems in 2005, and subsequently provided two commentaries in
2007.208
It is not clear whether this legal requirement of an internal control
system has helped reduce the possibility of accounting fraud. As
demonstrated by the fact that many accounting firms are still sanctioned by
the Financial Services Commission for defective audits,209 this system does
not appear to be airtight.210
C.

Whistleblower Protection

The Capital Markets Act also has a special section for protection of
whistleblowers. Anyone who has found unlawful conduct under the Capital
Markets Act, including the unfair trades listed in Book 4,211 or who has been
urged to violate the Capital Markets Act, may report such facts to the
Financial Services Commission. 212 The Financial Services Commission
shall keep confidential the identity of the informer.213 The organization to
which the informer belongs may not, directly or indirectly, discriminate
against him or her.214 The informer, on the other hand, may be compensated
by the Financial Services Commission up to KRW 100 million.215
In practice, however, compensation has never been paid out. Cases of
unfair trading in capital markets involving inside informers seem to be
extremely rare. The Financial Supervisory Services investigated 166 new
cases during the third quarter of 2010, of which 48 cases were initiated by
the Financial Supervisory Services and 157 cases were intiated by KRX.
This is in stark contrast with the United States, where employees and the
media report a substantial portion of instances of corporate fraud.216
208
FSS, STANDARD PRACTICE (Jun. 23, 2005). See also FSS, COMMENTARIES FOR SMALL AND
MEDIUM COMPANIES (Jun. 2007); FSS, COMMENTARIES FOR LARGE COMPANIES (Dec. 2005), available at
http://acct.fss.or.kr/acc/sub/page.jsp?pageNum=7&subNumber=1.
209
FSC, REVIEW OF FY 2010 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (Jan. 14, 2011). The sample review indicates
more defective audits were noted in 2010 (38 of 217) than in 2009 (24 of 212). Id.
210
As to the liability of officers and outside auditors to shareholders, see S. Ct.,
2006DA16758/16765, Oct. 25, 2007; S. Ct., 2007DA60080, Dec. 13, 2007; S. Ct., 2006DA19603, Nov. 30,
2007.
211
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16 (Book 4 addresses insider trading and unfair trading).
212
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 435; Capital Markets Act E.D., supra note 48, art. 384.
213
Id. art. 435(4).
214
Id. art. 435(5).
215
Press Release, FSS, 2010 Q3 Investigation Status Report (Oct. 28, 2010); see also Act on AntiCorruption and the Establishment and Operation of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, Act
No. 8878, Feb. 29, 2008, amended by Act No. 9402, Feb. 3, 2009, arts. 62-71; External Audits Act, supra
note 184, art. 15(3).
216
See I. J. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate
Fraud, 38 (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper 156/2007, 2007) (observing that in
216 reported fraud cases in large United States companies between 1996 and 2004, 34.3% of reports came
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DISCUSSION

Discussion of theories of punishment, including expressivist—that is,
the goal public condemnation—are beyond the scope of this article.
However, it may be helpful to remember the unique characteristics of whitecollar crime, including misconduct in the financial services market, as
distinguished from non-financial crimes. As Darryl Brown has put it:
Corporate and white-collar crime prosecution differs from street
crime prosecution because of its different mix of retributive and
deterrence concerns, which leads corporate crime policy to take
greater advantage of our knowledge of how social norms
interact with law, of the social costs that accompany
punishment, and of the alternatives to criminal law. . . . Our
white-collar crime policy has a much better mix of regulatory
strategies, civil remedies, and criminal sanctions.217
The current financial services market in Korea is responsive to
sanctions and deterrence. However, the focus of enforcement efforts should
move toward civil and preventive aspects of the policy tools because, in part,
the regulatory target is much more complicated than situations that may be
reduced to guilty or not guilty verdicts. 218 Furthermore, if criminal or
administrative sanctions are imposed by less controlled, haphazard
authorities, such sanctions become unpredictable. This has damaged and
will continue to damage the legitimacy of the law.
A.

Concern about Ineffective Sanctions and Due Process

The current Korean legal structure for regulating the financial services
market has incorporated most of the major enforcement mechanisms adopted
in both civil law and common law jurisdictions. It adopted criminal and
administrative enforcement mechanisms administered by public authorities,
which is a traditional approach in civil law jurisdictions. Private
enforcement based on strict liability and class action, an approach utilized in
from insiders); Geoffrey Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate
and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91 (2007) (arguing § 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
not sufficient to protect whistleblowers, proposing bounty model).
217
Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1297-98 (2001). But see Kyron Huigens, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and
Theories of Punishment: A Response to Brown, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2002) (objecting to Brown’s
theory of punishment).
218
This concept is not new. See IN-SUB CHOI ET AL., K. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, THE CURRENT
STATES OF FINANCIAL CRIME AND SOCIO-LEGAL COUNTERMEASURES IN KOREA (2002); YOUNG-MIN JANG
ET AL., K. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, DIE BEKAEMPFUNG DER BOERSENKRIMINALITAET (1994).
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the United States, is also available. All the features of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, including requirements for a board with outside independent directors,
an independent audit committee, whistleblower protection, and certification
of the CEO and disclosure officer, are also incorporated in Korean law.219
Although the current mechanism appears comprehensive and allinclusive, the reality is far from the purported aim of such legislative moves.
The current system is not entirely effective in addressing crimes in the
financial services market. Violations of the laws seem significant across the
board.220 The ongoing use of slush funds under borrowed names, stock price
manipulation with corporate funds, and other unlawful behavior 221 by
business leaders demonstrates the disregard for the law among the top
business executives. If top-notch business leaders behave this way, there is
some indication that small and medium business managers can be much
worse. The statistics illustrate the situation of continuously increasing cases
and disputes.222
More than a few corporations appear to have secret funds that are not
recorded on their books, but instead concealed by false names; this practice
is a violation of accounting rules.223 Most related party transactions between
financial institutions and controlling shareholders or their affiliates are, for
the purpose of managing the entrusted funds from their clients, subject to
strict regulations—some are prohibited, some are to be approved of or
reported. 224 It seems that companies are not fully complying with these
regulations.225 Loans in excess of legal limits have been made to affiliates,
and entrusted funds are invested in-group affiliates. 226 Requirements of
initial and continuous public disclosure in a timely and accurate manner are
not infrequently disregarded.227 Registration statements are not accurate and
219
See supra Part IV. The one significant difference is that Korean law requires only one half of the
board as independent for large listed or financial companies, while the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires a
majority of independent directors.
220
There seems to be no way to substantiate this observation with accurate statistical data. Refer to
the continuous scandals involving the top business executives, supra notes 13-14.
221
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
222
See Press Release, FSS, 2009 Dispute Statistics, supra note 149.
223
See, e.g., Press Release, FSC, Sanctions on Shinhan Bank for Violation of Real Name Financial
Transactions System (Nov. 18, 2010).
224
See supra Table 6.
225
FSC, Meeting Minutes (Nov. 18, 2010) (discussing mutual savings and loan practices for project
financing) available at http://www.fsc.go.kr/info/con_fscc_list.jsp.
226
Reviewing the sanctions of the FSC, these violations appear to be most frequent.
227
See, e.g., Press Release, FSC, Sanctions on Disclosure Requirements Violations (Nov. 24, 2010)
(announcing SFC resolutions on violations from false statement of purposes for financing to failure to
disclose major transactions). The SFC meets almost every other week to adopt sanctions on disclosure
violations.
For
examples,
visit
Press
Room,
FCC,
http://www.fsc.go.kr/info/ntc_news_list.jsp?menu=7210100&bbsid=BBS0030 (search in “sanctions” box).
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periodic disclosure documents contain false or misleading information. 228
Rumors are spread, and prices are manipulated.229
Why do violations occur?230 It is true that some people will always
commit crimes, as it is part of human nature. However, a truism is not a
sufficient explanation for financial market crimes, as they are linked to the
fundamentals of the economic system that allocates and mediates financial
resources.231 There are many possible explanations for this phenomenon.
Some argue that sanctions are not grave enough to deter potential violators.
This is true of some violations, 232 but not all.233 Others argue that violators
easily avoid the loose network of investigations, and therefore the regulatory
agencies should have broader investigatory authority.234
This article argues that violations occur because the regulatory
framework has not been accepted as establishing norms to be complied with
by the players in the market. When regulatory powers are centralized in
certain governmental agencies and their power is largely discretionary, one
tends to believe that the rules can be made inapplicable if one has the power
to influence the agencies. The public and the market players would not
accept these kinds of rules as true norms that require observance. To
enhance compliance, therefore, the rules of the game should be clear so that
players can understand what is prohibited and what is allowed. Business
people need to be educated about the rules to be observed, the odds of being
caught, and the resulting severe hardship. In addition, incentives can be
used to facilitate compliance when appropriate. 235 Only when business
228

Press Releases, FSS, http://www.fss.or.kr/kr/nws/nbd/bodobbs_l.jsp?gubun=01 (search for
“disclosure violations”). One curious thing is why so few suits have been filed regarding Securities and
Futures Commission sanctions.
229
E.g., Press Release, FSC, Sanctions on Unfair Trade Practices in Capital Market (Jan. 19, 2011)
(announcing SFC resolutions on unfair trade practices from price manipulations to failure to report 5%). At
least the number of violations discovered by the authorities has been increasing. See Securities and Unfair
Trade Complaint Center, FSS, http://www.fss.or.kr/scop/main.jsp (last visited April 28, 2011) (providing
statistics on unfair trade practices in the capital market).
230
See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ABA, ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE: PERSPECTIVES AND RESOURCES
FOR CORPORATE COUNSELORS 29-36 (2005) (listing theories of criminal motivations: Genetics; Greed;
Intent to Benefit the Employer; Ignorance; JanValjean Theory; Master of the Universe; Bad to the Bone;
and Milgram Effect).
231
FSC thus recently adopted policy directions to liberalize regulations for small and medium growth
companies and venture companies despite the possible insidious corruptions at KOSDAQ. See FSS,
Development of KOSDAQ (Jan. 26, 2011).
232
See Criminal Act, supra note 87 and accompanying text.
233
Criminal sanctions for insider trading and price manipulation seem to be sometimes excessively
harsh, especially the concept of price manipulation is not clear.
234
See Seoul C. Dist. Ct., 2010 KOHAP 11, Jan. 28, 2011.
235
A lack of a feeling of guilt is one of the general characteristics of corporate crimes, LEE CHEONHYUN, ET AL., K. INST.. OF CRIMINOLOGY, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS OF
CORPORATIONS 28-29 (2009), thus incentives may increase compliance.
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people think they should play the game following the rules, can these rules
become norms.
How can the Korean financial market become more advanced236 in the
sense that all the players compete in accordance with the rules and any
violators, if any, are found and punished? Modeling on every prevalent
current foreign law is to chase a phantom. To improve the situation, the
remedies should be coordinated and strategically focused, based on the
particular business environment of Korea’s national economy. This article
addresses two concerns about the current situation: 1) after-the-fact
sanctions may not be workable anymore; and 2) procedural safeguards
against less-controlled discretionary practices should be established.
Solutions for these concerns are discussed in the following section.
B.

Proposed Strategic Approaches to Enhance Compliance

This article proposes four strategic approaches to enhance compliance
in the Korean financial service market. The first approach is to utilize
incentives, including education. By offering incentives to implement
preventive compliance programs, Korean regulatory agencies can improve
the efficacy of the regulatory system. The preventive compliance programs
should be intertwined with the enforcement mechanism. The other three
approaches are to formulate clearer rules and to find the right balance among
various enforcement tools—between private and public and between
criminal and administrative. If too many different implementation measures
and resources are devoted to stopping misconduct in the financial services
market, this would lead to inefficient allocation of public capital. Specific
enforcement structures should be designed for different types of financial
crimes. Criminal sanctions should be limited to egregious violations and
those in which damages are not easily calculated. Administrative sanctions
are effective when immediate responses are desirable and criminal
conviction is not easy. Private damage claims in the form of class action
lawsuits should be more readily available to investors. In this way,
government agencies and private players in the market will reach their own
objectives and relative positions within specific timelines.

236
Many factors may be used to measure the financial market in a specific venue. The size of the
market capitalization is an obvious choice. The number of IPOs by foreign corporations can be another
tenet of competitive markets. Another measure is a review of market motivators, such as compliance costs
and the resulting benefits of international financing, such as lower capital cost and bonding premium.
Trustworthiness of the rules in the market is an important deciding factor. See SCOTT, supra note 193, at
48-55; COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION, supra note 80.
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Incentives of a Compliance Program

As mentioned above, financial institutions are required to have a fulltime compliance officer as well as internal control and accounting
systems.237 However, failure to meet such requirements leads to sanctions
while vigorous execution of the requirements leads to no rewards. 238
Rewards, however, incentivize stricter compliance with ex ante measures
and would ultimately lead to fewer violations. Such a compliance program
should thus be considered in determining the legal liability of a company. If
companies have implemented compliance programs, sanctions regarding a
violation should be mitigated.
The Korean Court Organization Law was revised to require
establishment of the Sentencing Commission on Apr. 27, 2007. 239 The
Sentencing Commission has vigorously built up the sentencing guidelines
for several categories of crimes since then; by 2010, murder, bribery, sex
crimes, embezzlement, and perjury were covered. 240 In line with the
Sentencing Commission’s efforts, the Korean Ministry of Justice has been
discussing the standards for arrests.241 As the Sentencing Commission and
the Ministry of Justice make progress in refining and expanding guidelines
for arrest and sentencing, 242 one factor to be considered is the compliance
program of a corporate entity. As discussed above, a corporate entity cannot
be held responsible for its employees or agents without a finding of
negligence in its supervision and operation. 243 Thus, compliance programs
of a corporate entity must be reviewed in determining the existence of
negligence on the corporate side.244 As civil fines on corporate entities also
require a finding of negligence, the practice of a compliance program’s
237

See supra Part IV.
For example, no dual liability has been recognized by courts because of the due diligence and care
over management and supervision of its employees.
239
Bupwonchojik beob [Court Organization Act], Act No. 3902, Dec. 4, 1987, amended by Act No.
9940, Apr. 25, 2010, art. 81(2).
240
Meeting minutes of the Korean Sentencing Commission are available at KOREAN SENTENCING
COMMISSION, http://sc.scourt.go.kr/sc/main/Main.work.
241
Press Release, Korean Ministry of Justice, International Symposium on Sentencing and Arrest
(Dec. 11, 2009).
242
As of 2010, murder, bribery, sex crimes, burglary, embezzlement, perjury, and false accusations
have been addressed.
243
See Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 448 (requiring failure of due care for corporate
criminal liability); Const. Ct., 2008 HUNGA10, Jul. 30, 2009 (holding unlimited dual penalty clauses
unconstitutional).
244
See supra note 85 and accompanying text. It is not clear whether no negligence is a defense from
the corporate side or whether negligence should be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecutors.
For an indication of similar options, see Kwan-Hoon Kwak, The Study on the Prevention of Corporate
Crime in Corporate Law, 32 GANGWON L. REV. 163, 175-177 (2011).
238
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requirements can operate as a defense. 245 Depending on the level of inhouse compliance programs, the prosecuting authority should consider
deferring the prosecution.
Even once a corporate entity has been held responsible for the
individual’s misconduct, compliance programs practice should be one of the
factors the court considers when determining fines. The current regulations
require the size of civil fines be determined in accordance with a formula
that is more detailed than that which determines the size of criminal fines.246
The current regulations on unfair trading in the capital market provide for
the possibility of a 20% reduction in fines if the financial institutions have
operated consistent compliance programs.247 As such, as long as civil fines
are concerned, compliance program practice offers a substantial incentive,
although it is rarely applied. This incentive should be expanded to the effect
that the sanction itself, or selection of a sanction, would be decided
considering a company’s compliance program practice.248 Like the case for
an anti-trust compliance program, the Financial Services Commission can
consider grading the compliance program to grant appropriate benefits to the
higher-level compliance programs.249
In incentivizing compliance, education in corporate life should be
credited and supported. Many contend that the driving force behind Korean
economic development for the past several decades has been education.250
“Education” in Korea often means achieving higher individual scores on
entrance exams at high schools and colleges. Education after graduation,
however, is possible and desirable. Continuing education will contribute to
245
Some scholars argue that the prosecutor should have the burden of proof in such a case. See
Andrew Weissmann, A New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIM. L.REV. 1319,
1319-24 (2007).
246
Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 430; Capital Markets Act E.D., supra note 48, art. 379;
Reg. A&S, supra note 97.
247
Reg. A&S, supra note 97, schedule 2, item 5.C(4). Cooperation with the investigatory authorities
also would be considered. Reg. A&S schedule 2, item 5.C(2) provides a 30% reduction for voluntary
remedial measure while item 5.C(3) permits a 20% reduction in the case of voluntary reporting of
violations. As to the leniency measures initiated from antitrust enforcement by the Korea Free Trade
Commission (“KFTC”), see Leniency System Operation Announcement, KFTC Public Notice No. 2005-7,
amended by KFTC Public No. 2009-46 (Aug. 20, 2009). However, not a single case has been found from
FSC and SFC decisions on the amount of fines based on the compliance program. See supra notes 134-35.
248
See Regulations on Case Management, supra note 133 (providing that KFTC may waive ab initio
investigation, depending on the level of compliance programs).
249
See id. (providing for rules of grading compliance programs into eight groups). As to the SEC
practice, see Report of Investigation Pursuant to § 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange
Act Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001) (setting forth thirteen factors to consider in determining whether to
credit self-policing, self-reporting and cooperation).
250
YUGUI GUO, ASIA'S EDUCATIONAL EDGE: CURRENT ACHIEVEMENTS IN JAPAN, KOREA, TAIWAN,
CHINA, AND INDIA 75-118 (2005).
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higher collective achievements of social goals such as legal compliance.
Education programs for compliance should be developed and utilized by
corporations. It is true that KRX and KOFIA have been operating many
seminars and education programs, and Korean law colleges and schools have
done the same.251 However, not many compliance-related programs have
been offered yet. 252 By requiring corporate entities to run education
programs about compliance, Korea should finally be able to become a
respected member of the global corporate world.253
2.

Clearer Rules

Some argue that the principle-based regulation used in the United
Kingdom provides a better alternative to the rules-based approach of the
United States because the market always works better than regulations.254
Many believe the United Kingdom’s more principle-based system makes the
financial market more competitive.255 The argument preferring one to the
other is not convincing. Not only is the concept of principle-based
regulation itself not clear,256 but law is always a combination of principles
and rules. Without principles, the full meaning of rules is hard to grasp.
Without detailed rules, the full significance of principles is difficult to
enforce. They are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are complementary.
Separating rules and principles would not help to frame the future regulatory
framework for capital markets.

251

For example, Yonsei Law School offers compliance seminars to its students.
As to the curriculum of law schools in Korea, Young-Cheol Jeong, Korean Legal Education for
the Age of Professionalism: Suggestions for More Concerted Curricula, 5 EAST ASIA L. REV. 155, 164-65
(2010).
253
As an ex post facto measure, the KFTC can request the firm get educated. See KFTC, Operating
Manual on Corrective Measures, Nov. 1, 2005, amended on Aug. 12, 2009, art. VII.3(c).
254
For example, Professor Scott believes “[t]he United States clearly seems to be more enforcementoriented, through the use of actions, than its capital market competitors, and this may be partially
responsible for its loss of competitiveness.” SCOTT, supra note 193, at 156. He is also critical of the fact
that the SEC as an agency is dominated by lawyers and that economists play a marginal role in the
formulation of regulation or enforcement policy, suggesting the SEC use cost-benefit analysis in
connection with its proposals. Id.; see also Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial
Regulation: Lessons from the SEC’s Stalled Mutual Reform Effort, 12 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2006);
Luigi Zingales, The Costs and Benefits of Financial Market Regulation (European Corporate Governance
Institute, Working Paper 21/2004, Apr. 2004) (supporting disclosure and whistleblower enforcement
mechanisms as the least costly options).
255
See Julia Black, Martyn Hopper & Christa Band, Making a Success of Principles-Based
Regulation, 1 L. & FIN. MKT. REV. 191 (2007); PAUL NELSON, CAPITAL MARKETS LAW AND COMPLIANCE
19-53 (2008).
256
See Lawrence Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of Principle-Based System in
Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411 (2007).
252
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In terms of relative weight, Korea needs more rules because too many
rule-making functions have been delegated to the executive branch over the
past several decades, in the name of efficiency. As Korea needs to make law
based on political consensus and a more democratic process, the legislators
need more training and time. Nonetheless, no policy or statute can be
enforceable based on skeleton authorization from the legislative branch and
enforcement from the executive branch. The statutes should be more
focused on rules as a legitimate check to executive discretion. Unclear rules
lead citizens to turn to political influence instead of trying to comply with
rules, a dynamic that politicians and decision-makers seem to want to
maintain. Korea needs rules that are more detailed, not more principles.257
One of the most persuasive arguments for broad executive authority in
regards to the financial market is that the market is volatile and policy
responses should be prompt. In terms of quantity, this might be true.
However, there are many ways for regulatory agencies to respond to the
market. Civil culture and legitimacy of law are the core values of
compliance with law, and thus formulation of principles and rules should be
reserved for the legislative branch. This is why the former Korean Ministry
of Finance used to regulate the corporate finance of listed companies under
the Securities and Exchanges Act before the Capital Markets Act entered
into effect on February 4, 2009. After most sections were reassigned to the
Korean Commercial Code,258 the Korean capital market functioned without
any serious crises. The actual market situation over the past few years is a
demonstration that rules can and should regulate the capital market.
Concerns over democratic legitimacy, however, are not necessarily of
the utmost importance. More important is the inefficiency of the system
stemming from the delegation of rulemaking to the executive branch. As
Korean society is significantly diverse and complicated, unilateral
rulemaking from the executive branch can no longer operate as a means of
reaching consensus. It is true that legislative lawmaking competency could
be improved. That, however, does not mean it is desirable that Korea
statutes and rules should be formulated and processed interminably by the
executive branch.
As the National Assembly of Korea has been
institutionalizing the Research Service and Budget Office 259 to assist its
legislative activities, it needs more work and responsibilities.
257
MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION, PROJECT REPORT ON DELEGATED LEGISLATION,
available at http://www.moleg.go.kr/knowledge.
258
But see Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, arts. 165(2)-(18) (providing for listed companies).
259
See NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RESEARCH SERVICE, http://www.nars.go.kr (last visited Apr. 29, 2011);
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUDGET OFFICE, http://www.nabo.go.kr/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).
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Balance between Public and Private Enforcement

Public and private enforcement mechanisms have much room for
improvement, 260 and the right balance should be struck between the two
enforcement avenues. The balance between ex post facto measures and ex
ante programs should also be parsed. Under the Korean Constitution, public
powers may intrude into private domains, including the self-sufficient
market, for limited purposes and pursuant to specific processes and explicit
authorization. Hence, public capital should be used according to the
priorities of the model’s assumptions and maxims. Such expenditures, thus,
are to be allocated depending on the severity of financial crimes and the
efficacy of such spending, among other things. 261 Such allocation is, in
reality, the outcome of political process.
Figure 1, below, shows the overall enforcement mechanism and
ensuing resource allocation depending on the severity of violations and
efficacy of public spending. While the current flow of public resources in
the diagram runs from left to right, this article argues the more desirable
direction of the flow should be from right to left because the efficacy of
diverse enforcement tools also runs from right to left.
Ex post facto

Public

Criminal

Ex ante

Private

Administrative

Priority of public capital allocation
Severity of financial crimes/efficacy of expenditure/political process
Current flow of resources

Ideal flow of resources

[FIGURE 1] PRIORITY OF DIVERSE ENFORCEMENT TOOLS
The starting point for change is to provide opportunities for a remedy
to private entities, except in cases of violations of moral principles. 262
260

See supra Part III.
See infra Figure 1.
262
One may argue that all financial crimes are just from greed and thus not a violation of moral
principles. However, certain crimes that are equivalent to fraud are related to moral principles, such as
insider trading, addressed by the Capital Markets Act, supra note 16, art. 174.
261
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Regardless of whether sanctions are from the court in response to the public
prosecutor’s indictment, or from the Financial Services Commission as a
result of its investigation, their basic aim is to impose hardship on the
violators for their past misconduct, and thus to minimize future violations by
the violator and others. Deterrence is one of the major reasons for sanctions.
Even so, the deterrent effect has proved to be limited at best,263 and thus the
basic approach to sanctions should be to minimize them. Misconduct in the
financial market is not always frivolous, but in most cases it is technical
(except fraud), making these kinds of violations more suitable for private
entities to handle. On the other hand, criminal sanctions should be limited to
the cases in which the social impact is enormous. 264 In cases where the
damages are not easily calculable, public sanctions should be taken more
seriously.
One way to measure the balancing point between public and private
enforcement mechanisms is cost-benefit analysis. The financial services
industry in Korea accounted for 6.3% of the 2009 GDP. In terms of
employment, it accounts for approximately 3.5% of the total employment.265
If official costs of enforcement are the sum of the Financial Services
Commission and the Financial Supervisory Services budgets, 266 they
comprise 1.6% of the government spending. 267 If official costs of
enforcement, benchmarked to GDP, are calculated, about $47,000 per billion
dollars of GDP were spent on regulatory costs for the financial services
industry in 2010.268 If Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation’s269 budget and
263

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text; see also GAIL PEARSON, FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW
AND COMPLIANCE IN AUSTRALIA 502 (2009) (“[C]riminal penalties are viewed by regulators as a matter of
last resort, particularly as they take up significant resources and [the] criminal standard of culpability . . . is
harder to prove.”).
265
Economic Status System, BANK OF KOREA, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).
Year
Financial services
GDP
Total Employees
Financial services
(KRW in billions)
(in thousands)
2005
53,394.8
865,240.9
n/a
n/a
2006
55,234.7
908,743.8
23,151
786
2007
61,114.0
975,013.0
23,433
806
2008
65,132.2
1,026,451.8
23,577
821
2009
66,283.3
1,063,059.1
23,506
766
264

266

The firms’ compliance costs also should be part of the total cost weighed against the benefits.
MINISTRY OF STRATEGY AND FINANCE, http://www.mosf.go.kr/_lib/lib02/lib02index.jsp (last
visited Apr. 29, 2011).
2009 (KRW millions) Total budget: 199,875,979
FSC: 2,883,772
FSS: 246.4
267

268
FSS is substantially financed by financial institutions’ contribution. See Financial Services
Commission Act, supra note 39, art. 47. Official costs of enforcement, of course, can be expanded to
include the budgets of both the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (“KDIC”), see infra note 269, and the
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Korea Asset Management Corporation’s270 liabilities are counted as part of
the enforcement costs, it would go up to almost $90,000 per billion
dollars.271 Compared to the figures in the United Kingdom and the United
States 272 in terms of the ratio of the enforcement cost to the size of the
financial market, Korea seems to be at high end. As such, private
enforcement is the logical alternative to be encouraged.
This does not mean Korean public officials are corrupt, captured by
the industry, or insufficiently trained. The argument for private enforcement
does not stem from concerns about politically biased actions from public
authorities. Korean bureaucracy seems to have been mostly competent and
mostly apolitical. The argument also does not deny the possibility that
private enforcement will be abused. It appears true in many cases that
private enforcement actions are initiated on the back of factual records
created by public authorities. Factual investigation and corresponding
policy formation will remain largely with the public enforcement agencies.
However, as the size and complexity of the Korean economy expands, the
coverage of the bureaucracy should be decreased. Private enforcement
mechanisms would be able to supplement public efforts proportionally as the
financial services industry grows. Therefore, the right balancing point
between public and private enforcement should move towards the private
enforcement side.
More specifically, the current class action system would have to be
liberalized to the effect that small investors may access legal representation
in calling for compensatory damages.273 As discussed above, the Securities
and Futures Commission ordered civil money penalties relating to ten cases
of disclosure violations in the fiscal year of 2009-2010. 274 Without the
private enforcement possibility, however, the current scale of civil fines
Korea Asset Management Corporation (“KAMCO”), see infra note 270, as well as other government thinktank costs.
269
For 2010, the annual budget of the KDIC was KRW 178 billion. Financial Status, KDIC,
https://www.kdic.or.kr/introduce/estimate.jsp (last visited May 11, 2011). KDIC is similar to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation in the United States.
270
For 2009, the liability of KAMCO was KRW 2.45 trillion. Financial Statements, KAMCO,
http://www.kamco.or.kr/home/man/04_03.jsp (last visited May 11, 2011). KAMCO handles all sorts of
bad assets on behalf of diverse financial institutions.
271
John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 260
(2007) ("Only South Korea . . . approaches the GDP-adjusted expenditures of the common law countries.").
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The total regulatory expenditure per billion of GDP in 2004 was $425,804 in the United States and
$276,655 in the United Kingdom. Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation:
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. REG. 253, 268-69 (2007). Prof. Jackson’s
United States figure includes FDIC budgets. The cost for 2010 would be substantial.
273
One possibility is to expand the coverage of the Securities Class Action Act to breaches of the
Capital Markets Act. Restrictions on legal representation also should be obviated.
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FSS, Sanctions on Disclosure Violations, supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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would not be a deterrent, considering the certainty of public enforcement.
The most probable reason for the lack of private legal action seems to be
limited access to legal remedies for small investors. Accessibility could also
be improved by increasing the number of professional lawyers who are free
from the captured interest of conglomerates, which dominate the economic
scene in Korea. To reach critical mass for legal representation, especially for
class action suits, attorneys should be readily available for all causes of
action.
Many criticisms may be raised under the current mode of regulations
in Korea. It may be true that some extra additional maneuvering by the
government is possible. However, one cannot expect that government
authorities can do everything. Furthermore, the government cannot be held
responsible for everything. Except for certain types of misconduct in the
financial services market where damages are not easily calculated,
expansion of class actions appears to be the most realistic and least intrusive
option to compensate mistreated investors.
4.

Balance between Criminal and Administrative Sanctions

Based on the modern nation-state model, minimization of criminal
conduct is the first principle. The second principle is that criminal penalties
should be proportionate to the crimes. The third principle is that all powers
should be institutionalized and systemized in order to be controllable. These
are also the legal foundations of the mandate of government power,
including prosecutorial authority. Even from a policy point of view, a
prosecutor without principles has no legitimacy, and thus would quickly lose
the confidence of the public. Without institutional trust from the public, no
public agency could survive. If law enforcement institutions are ineffective,
more crimes will occur. 275 Fewer resources would then be available, which
would in turn lead to more crimes. 276 This is a typical vicious circle at
institutional levels.
The financial services market plays a pivotal role of distributing
limited financial resources within a society.277 It is a nerve center of the
economic system. However, that does not mean violations in the financial
275
See Raaj K. Sah, Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1272, 1280 (1991)
(“[A]n individual has a higher current propensity for crime if fewer resources were spent on the criminal
apprehension system during a past period of his active life. Fewer resources dilute the resources spent on
apprehending each criminal.”).
276
See id.
277
S. Ct., 2000DA9086, Mar. 15, 2002 (acknowledging special functions of banks, the Court directed
that stricter fiduciary duty be imposed on management).
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market should be penalized. Nor does it mean that corporate entities should
be fined in addition to individuals. As explained above, though, the current
situation is dreadful.278 Every violation of the applicable laws involving the
financial market is subject to severe criminal sanctions. Corporate entities
are subject to dual penalties. Only the public prosecutor has the
monopolistic power to file an indictment. No failed prosecution is checked
by outsiders. Additionally, public prosecutors lack the investigatory
expertise or instruments for financial market crimes. Thus, public
prosecutors should narrow their jurisdiction over criminal conduct, which in
turn would advance the efficiency of criminal sanctions.
The Ministry of Justice should revisit the scope of crimes under the
foregoing tripartite statutes on financial markets. After narrowing the reach
of criminal sanctions, the severity of the punishment should be increased so
that it is measured proportionate to the crimes. Finally, the Ministry of
Justice should develop a control mechanism to prevent illegitimate
discretion. It should seriously consider developing guidelines and criteria to
measure its discretionary power in writing.279 Guidelines might have to be
memorialized in writing as opposed to hierarchical approval procedures.
The Internal Audit Committee and the Prosecution Citizens Committee
should be more active.280
Compared to the Ministry of Justice, the Financial Services
Commission has developed more detailed rules to calculate the amount of
civil fines. To make them more effective, however, the amount of civil fines
should increase substantially.281 The capital market cannot be developed by
applying loose rules to the issuers of securities. Rather, the regulator’s
policy goals should be to protect investors. In the case of price cartels, the
fine is based on the gross sales revenue during the collusion. It is not limited
to unusual gains from the collusion. Likewise, the size of a fine does not
have to be capped at KRW 2 billion.282 To make administrative sanctions
more certain, the Financial Services Commission should have extensive
power to investigate the players in the market. The Financial Services
Commission should develop formal procedures for hearings and other factgathering methods283 in order to fully develop due process. At the same
278

See supra Part III.A.
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time, the procedural protection of individuals as well as firms should be
clarified in writing. In sum, the balance between criminal and administrative
sanctions should move towards administrative sanctions with due process
safety mechanisms firmly in place.284
VI.

CONCLUSION

Phenomenally, Korea has built an industrial complex from green
fields over the past several decades. The size of the financial market in
Korea is already substantial, 285 and it no longer stands alone, but is
connected to international financial markets. 286 The current enforcement
system is full of gestures and postures, ultimately creating nothing but a
facade. Enforcement mechanisms, however, should not only be part of the
code, but also function within the system. Now Korea must develop the
financial intermediaries and ensure the framework is efficiently constructed.
Korea’s regulatory framework should shift from backward-looking to
forward-leaning. Threats of sanctions for past conduct are not a sufficient
deterrent, and compliance should be considered to determine criminal and
administrative liability.
Education, which made Korean economic
development possible, is a critical component to operate an effective
compliance program. The magnitude of sanctions is not sufficient. The lack
of certainty in sanctions cannot be ignored considering the size and
interconnection of the financial services market in Korea. The rules must
become clearer.
Discussion about the most desirable regulatory structures for the
financial services market in Korea is important. Two increasingly important
topics are how to establish an effective regulatory scheme and how to
maximize efficacy and procedural and distributive justice within the system.
By adopting the systemic and comprehensive approaches proposed in this
article, Korea can formulate more enticing mechanisms to encourage market
players to implement best practices as part of their business practices.
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